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INTRODUCTION
In 1974, then-Chief Justice Warren Burger admitted during oral
arguments in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States' that he
occasionally photocopied copyrighted material for his own use or
to share with his colleagues on the bench.2 Was the Chief Justice
1. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 80-113.
2. A book by Professor Paul Goldstein documents the exchange between Chief
Justice Warren Burger and William & Wilkins counsel Alan Latman:
[Burger:] "It's not uncommon for judges, members of this Court and others, to
call on the Library of Congress for a book...of which they have only one or a
very few copies. At least I assume that, because frequently we get a request,
'Will you please return the book.' Well, sometimes instead of returning the
book if we are not finished with it, speaking personally, I have Chapter 13 or
Chapter 14 copied on the Xerox machine...". Is such a borrower, Burger want-
ed to know, "running up against this statute and these claims by making a copy
for his own use, copyrighted material?"
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guilty of copyright infringement? At the time, the issue was neatly
sidestepped: whether such copying constituted copyright infringe-
ment need not be addressed, the Chief Justice surmised, because no
one would sue him based on the de minimis nature of the recovery
involved.3
Things have changed in the intervening years. Although the
Chief Justice's question has not been answered, one cannot be so
sure he would not be sued. Nowadays, both Supreme Court Justic-
es and ordinary individuals would be well advised to reconsider
their personal and workplace photocopying practices in light of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.4 and the very real threat of
copyright infringement litigation that it represents. Four years after
Chief Justice Burger speculated on the legal status of personal
photocopying in the workplace, a group of publishers in 1978 orga-
nized the Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC") as a clearinghouse
to sell photocopy licenses to businesses, academic institutions, law
firms, libraries, copy shops, and bookstores.5  Beginning in the
...Latman responded, "That is a harder question, which we think is quite
different from this case." After circling briefly, he gave his well-prepared
answer: "Nobody would sue. And I think that's quite significant here, because
it's impractical for anyone to sue."
...The Chief Justice smiled, deciding not to press the point, deflecting it
instead with what in the Supreme Court passes for humor. "Is it your opinion
nobody would sue the Chief Justice or that nobody would sue anybody?" The
courtroom burst into laughter.
Latman played it straight. "Nobody would sue the Chief Justice or an
individual. No one would sue an individual. It's an impractical medium-"
"It's a damage claim," Burger intejected. "Suppose I make ten copies to
send to my colleagues so that we would all be sharing in that. The recovery
might be de minimis, so that no one would have any incentive to sue."
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 117-19 (1994).
3. Id. at 118-19.
4. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995). Although the case
was originally decided in 1994 and reported at 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second
Circuit amended and reissued its opinion in July, 1995. See infra notes 325-26 and
accompanying text.
5. For a discussion about the formation of the CCC, see Goldstein, supra note 2, at
219-21; and A. F. Spilhaus, The Copyright Clearance Center, 9 SCHOLARLY PUB. 143, 150
(1978).
19961
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1980s, publishers instituted legal actions against some of the na-
tion's more sizable corporations whose employees were known to
make in-house photocopies of copyrighted works.6 Regular reward
notices began appearing in periodicals, offering monetary compen-
sation to those who could furnish conclusive evidence of unautho-
rized photocopying. 7 And, in 1985, numerous CCC-member scien-
tific and technical journal publishers sued Texaco,8 a company that
purchased a CCC photocopy license 9 but, according to the CCC,
had failed to accurately report the extent of its photocopying. 0
In American Geophysical, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found a Texaco research scientist guilty of copyright infringement
for making single photocopies of eight scientific articles from vari-
ous issues of a scholarly journal." Texaco relied, unsuccessfully,
on the defense of "fair use," a doctrine that limits the seemingly
absolute rights of copyright owners to control the use of their copy-
righted works.' 2 Originally created by judges,1 3 the fair use excep-
6. See, e.g., Pasha Publications, Inc. v. Enmark Gas Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1076 (N.D.
Tex. 1992); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Squibb Corp., No. 82-2363 (S.D.N.Y. filed
April 14, 1982) (settlement agreement reproduced in Corporate Copyright & Info. Prac.
153-66 (1983)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Corp., No. 81-
7813 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 16, 1981) (settlement agreement reproduced in Corporate
Copyright & Info. Prac. 149-52 (1983)); Pfizer, Texaco Agree with AAP on Copying,
PUBLISHER'S WKLY., Apr. 22, 1983.
7. See, e.g., Jay Ward Brown & Elizabeth C. Koch, American Geophysical Union
v. Texaco: Could Developments in Copyright Law Pull the Plug on the Office Copier?,
10 COMM. LAW. 3, 20 (winter 1993).
For example, a Washington D.C. law firm was sued by Washington Business Infor-
mation, Inc. (WBII) after WBII ran an advertisement in its Product Safety Newsletter
offering $2,000 to anyone who could provide WBII with evidence of unauthorized photo-
copying of its publications. See David Margolick, When a Firm Cuts Corners, It is
Caught in Copyright Embarrassment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1991, at B7.
8. Six publishers filed the initial lawsuit against Texaco; however, seventy-eight
additional plaintiffs had joined the suit before the end of the trial. American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
9. Id. at 25 n.23.
10. Copyrights: Photocopying Suit to Continue Despite Lack of Copying Specifics in
Pleadings, 32 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 786, at 197-98 (June 26, 1986).
11. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931.
12. Id. at 914. 17 U.S.C. § 106 grants to the copyright owner the exclusive rights
to reproduce the copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the
(Vol. 6:641
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tion recognizes that the advance of science, education, and culture
requires that the public be allowed a reasonable right to copy or
otherwise use copyrighted material without providing payment to,
or obtaining permission from, the copyright owner.14 Authors,
artists, and scholars build upon the work of others when generating
their own contributions to society. 15 Without the fair use doctrine,
copyright owners might thwart this building process by enforcing
their rights so rigorously that copyrighted works could never be
used as the basis for later creative works. 1
6
Congress codified the fair use doctrine in Section 10717 of the
public, to prepare derivative works, to publicly perform the copyrighted work, and to
display the copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
13. In the United States, the first reported decision using the term "fair use" was
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass 1869). However, the concept that some
uses of copyrighted materials would not constitute infringement despite the wording of
the copyright statute was applied even earlier in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728), and Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901).
American judges developed the doctrine in reliance on English case law. See, e.g.,
Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 2 Atk. 141 (1740); Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep.
679, 681, 4 Esp. 168, 170 (1803).
For a discussion of these American and English cases, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE
FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-36 (1985).
14. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994) ("From
the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials
has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[tlo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts .... ') (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) ("Fair use was traditionally
defined as 'a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent."') (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
15. "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predeces-
sors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant him-
self.' Progress would be stifled if the author had a complete monopoly of everything in
his book for fifty-six years or any other long period." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections
on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945).
16. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 n.3 (noting that fair use "permits courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster") (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). In full, this section currently reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
1996]
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Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"),18 stating at the time that it did
not intend either to define the doctrine conclusively' 9 or to change
it as it had evolved in the courts.20 The statute sets out four nonex-
clusive21 factors that courts are instructed to consider in making fair
use determinations: (1) the purpose and character of the use of the
copyrighted material;2 2 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;23 (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determin-
ing whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id.
18. Copyright Law of the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §101-810 (1994)).
19. The House Report on the Copyright Act explains that "since the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
20. "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." Id. at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5680.
21. Because Section 107 introduces the four factors with the phrase "shall include,"
courts are not limited to consideration of the statutory factors alone. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994). See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994); Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); Princeton Univ.
Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 74 F.3d 1512, 1524 (6th Cir.), opinion withdrawn,
vacated, and reh'g en banc granted, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1147-52
(1990). But see Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1125-26 (1990) (concluding that any additional elements are "false factors" that should
not be considered in fair use determinations).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
23. See id. § 107(2).
[Vol. 6:641
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copyrighted work as a whole;24 and (4) the effect of the use on the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
In American Geophysical, the court's rejection of Texaco's
claim of fair use relied, in part, on its consideration of the fourth
statutory fair use factor-the effect of Texaco's copying on the
potential market for the copyrighted work-and ultimately on the
existence of the CCC.26 Because Texaco could have paid for its
copies under a CCC photocopy license, the court reasoned that the
journal publishers had demonstrated the existence of both a "work-
able" market in photocopy licenses and a substantial harm to the
value of their copyrights based on lost licensing revenue attribut-
able to unauthorized copying.27
In other words, the Second Circuit in American Geophysical
embraced an "economic" or "market failure" approach to the fair
use doctrine. Simply stated, this theory instructs courts to apply
the fair use doctrine only to those unauthorized uses of copyrighted
materials that result from a particular "market failure., 28 According
to this theory, as long as would-be users can purchase access to
copyrighted works through consensual market transactions, they
must pay the market price or face the consequences of infringement
liability. 29 By forming the CCC to license the photocopying of
journal articles, journal publishers removed the justification under
this theory for courts to treat such duplication as a fair use.
Furthermore, despite Chief Justice Burger's description of his
24. See id. § 107(3).
25. See id. § 107(4).
26. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931.
27. Id. at 930-931.
28. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1605 (1982) (concluding that proof of market failure is and should be a threshold require-
ment for a judicial finding of fair use); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357-58 (1989) (reasoning
that fair use is only appropriate when the high transaction costs of obtaining a copyrighted
work effectively proscribe a voluntary market exchange).
For a summary discussion of the economic theory of fair use, see CRAIG JOYCE, ET
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 822-23 (3d ed. 1993).
29. Gordon, supra note 28, at 1614-15.
1996]
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own copying as de minimis,30 subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have established that the potential market effect of unauthorized
reproduction is not judged by scrutinizing the copying activities of
a lone infringer, but by examining the effect of widespread copying
among all similarly situated users.3' The proper measure of the
market impact of Chief Justice Burger's copying, therefore, would
include all significant copying by all present and former Supreme
Court Justices, their clerks and secretaries, and perhaps all the
remaining personnel of the entire federal judiciary.
While the economic approach to fair use has gained adherents
over the past decade, 32 it also has wide-ranging implications regard-
ing the future of the fair use doctrine and public access to informa-
tion in a world of changing technology. Taken to its logical exten-
sion, this market analysis would require the fair use doctrine to
give way whenever marketers come up with new methods of exact-
ing payment for the use of copyrighted information.33
30. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
31. See, e.g., Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177 (stating that to determine the effect of the
use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work, courts must "consider not only
the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also 'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential markets' for the origi-
nal" (quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1984)); Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 568 ("[To negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use 'should be-
come widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
work."') (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984)).
32. See, e.g., William W.. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine; 101
HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1728-29 (1988) (suggesting that judges consider the existence or
potential development of blanket licensing organizations in determining whether unautho-
rized copying constitutes fair use); Scott M. Martin, Photocopying and the Doctrine of
Fair Use: The Duplication of Error, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 345, 392
(1992) (questioning the applicability of the fair use doctrine to photocopying activities
once licensing organizations develop); Mary R. Barry, Note, Multiple Photocopying by
Educators and the Fair Use Doctrine: The Court's Role in Reducing Transaction Costs,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 408 (stating that judges should act as "market facilitators"
when applying the fair use doctrine to instances of educational photocopying). But see
PATRY, supra note 13, at 456-57 n.520 (concluding that an economic approach to fair use
creates too narrow an inquiry); Weinreb, supra note 21, at 1150-51 (identifying non-
economic factors that should be considered in a fair use analysis).
33. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249,
[Vol. 6:641
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In that regard, the Second Circuit's decision in American Geo-
physical carries special significance for two reasons. First, al-
though Texaco originally challenged the decision in a petition for
certiorari filed with the Supreme Court,34 Texaco decided against
pursuing further appeals and instead agreed to pay a seven-figure
settlement and retroactive licensing fee to the CCC.3 5  The CCC
has cited the American Geophysical case in its promotional litera-
ture since the district court ruled in the publishers' favor,36 and the
organization has capitalized on its victory against Texaco by using
the ruling to increase sales of photocopy licenses.37  Chances ap-
pear remote that another entity will be disposed to take on the CCC
in the name of fair use in a non-educational setting.38
263 (1992). But see Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d
1512, 1524 (6th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, vacated, and reh'g en banc granted, 74 F.3d
1528 (6th Cir. 1996), where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in an educational
context, a commercial copy center's reproduction and sale of excerpts from copyrighted
materials for student use qualified as a fair use. In so holding, the court described as
circular the copyright owners' argument that the use was unfair because it deprived them
of their standard permission fees. Id. at 1523. 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996). For a
discussion of this case, see infra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
34. See 50 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1227, at 14 (May 4,
1995).
35. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed Texaco's petition for certiorari, 60
F.3d 913 (2d. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 591 (1995). See Publishers, Texaco settle
suit, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 1, 1995, at 52.
36. See, "e.g., -Copyright Clearance Center, Creating Copyright Solutions 9 (1993)
("The 1992 Texaco decision underscored CCC's unique and vital role in collective licens-
ing of photocopying.")
37. A recent CCC brochure, intended to market CCC's Annual Authorization Service
licensing system, states that "CCC participating publishers will not pursue unasserted
claims of copyright infringement against licensed companies." Copyright Clearance
Center, Annual Authorizations Service (AAS) brochure (1995) (on file with the author).
See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 223 (describing CCC's marketing approach as a "carrot-
and stick" strategy and reporting that CCC's estimated royalty payments in 1993 almost
tripled from those received in 1992).
38. Following the American Geophysical decision both at the district and circuit court
level, articles in various legal publications have recommended that lawyers counsel their
clients to avoid copyright infringement liability by purchasing photocopy licenses. See,
e.g., H. Roy Berkenstock, Will Your Fair Use Net a Foul?, 13 ACCA DOCKET 62, 64
(March/April 1995) (stating that "wise counsel.., will procure a license for the inevitable
copying of copyrighted materials for internal use"); Brown & Koch, supra note 7 at 21
(advising periodical subscribers to consider joining the CCC); Michael F. Clayton, Photo-
copies and Fair Use: How to Avoid Copyright Liability, 40 PRAc. LAW. 81, 86 (June
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Second, the market approach espoused by the Second Circuit
in American Geophysical can easily be extended to the world of
electronic technology-the information superhighway.39 Copyright
owners naturally favor a "pay-as-you-go" approach to electronic
transmissions of copyrighted works, an integral characteristic of
what Professor Goldstein has described as "the celestial jukebox." 4
For its part, the CCC has been working to expand its licensing
services into the electronic frontier by developing electronic copy-
right clearance and information metering on computer networks
such as the Internet. 1
But are copyright owners' rights in copyrighted works really as
extensive as the CCC and other publishers claim? The Supreme
Court has held that the ultimate goal of copyright law is not to
promote new markets or economic growth, but rather to advance
learning and thereby further the public good.a2 As a mechanism to
1994) ("[T]he only sure method of avoiding copyright liability is to seek a license either
directly from the copyright owner or from the CCC.").
With respect to photocopying in an educational context, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently held that a commercial copy center's reproduction and sale of excerpts
from copyrighted materials for student use qualified as a fair use. See infra notes 49-77
and accompanying text (discussing in depth the Michigan Document Services case).
39. The information superhighway is formally known as the National Information
Infrastructure ("Nil"). Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 29, 29 (1994). The NIl has been defined as "a system of high-speed tele-
communications networks, databases, and advanced computer systems that will make
electronic information and entertainment products more widely available and accessible
to the public than ever before." Request for Comments on Intellectual Property Issues
Involved in the National Information Infrastructure Initiative, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,917 (1993).
40. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 28. Goldstein describes how consumers will use this
celestial jukebox as follows:
None of this will come free. The celestial jukebox will bill subscribers much
as the telephone company does.... Where the telephone company charges calls
on the basis of length and time of day, the celestial jukebox will also be able
to charge according to the value of the work transmitted.
Id.
41. Folio Corporation and Copyright Clearance Center Create First Solution for
Electronic Copyright Protection, Copyright Clearance Center & Folio Corporation, March
6, 1995 (press release on file with the author).
42. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the chief purpose of copyright is to
promote learning. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1030 (1994)
(stating that "copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public
through access to creative works"); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
[Vol. 6:641
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achieve this goal, the copyright law provides financial incentives
to encourage authors and artists to create and disseminate their
original works.43 In applying the copyright law, then, courts must
be careful not to favor the mechanism at the expense of the goal.
A pure market approach to fair use could thwart copyright's pur-
pose of advancing public knowledge and welfare by creating what
has been called "a purchase tax on learning materials,"'  where
only those with the wherewithal to pay are allowed access to useful
information. The resulting balance struck between authors' (read
"publishers'") 45 and users' rights would be skewed so far in favor
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (explaining that "[tihe primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts'
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (declaring that "[c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded,
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public avail-
ability of literature, music, and the other arts"); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to
the owner a secondary consideration.... [R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce
release to the public of the products of his creative genius.").
Commentators, however, have not always clearly understood copyright's ultimate
purpose. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 3 ("[I]f the work has commercial value,
copyright's aim is to put that value in the copyright owner's pocket."); Laurie C. Tepper,
Copyright Law and Library Photocopying: An Historical Survey, 84 L. LIBR. J. 341, 341
(1992) ("Copyright ... is designed to prevent the unauthorized copying of written works
.... .).
43. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."' (quot-
ing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
44. Patterson, supra note 33, at 263.
45. Most creators assign all or at least a portion of their rights under the copyright
law to publishers or other marketing agents. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W.
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USER'S RIGHTS 188-89 (1991).
American copyright law recognizes this fact of life by granting rights to copyright "own-
ers" rather than to authors or creators. See supra note 17 (for the complete text of 17
U.S.C. § 106); see also Goldstein, supra note 2, at 168-69 ("[Tlhe American culture of
copyright centers on a hard, utilitarian calculus that balances the needs of copyright
producers against the needs of copyright consumers, a calculus that appears to leave
authors at the margins of its equations."); PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra, at 20
("[R]egardless of conventional wisdom, which has long viewed copyright as belonging
to authors, copyright began and continues to function much the same as it did for its
originators, that is, primarily to protect the publisher's marketing of works.").
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of copyright holders as to practically eliminate fair use in the per-
sonal or business context. Users would still have access to copy-
righted information-but only for a price.
This Article addresses the impact the market approach to
fair use will have on individual and workplace user's rights to
copyrighted material, an inquiry not pursued by the court in Ameri-
can Geophysical. Part I briefly summarizes major judicial deci-
sions concerning photocopying in various settings. Part II analyzes
the particular facts and holding in the American Geophysical opin-
ion. Part III identifies fundamental, unanswered, or insufficiently
considered issues raised by American Geophysical, including
whether intermediate copying should be considered transformative
"research" within the meaning of Section 107 of the 1976 Act,
whether copying one article from a collective work should be con-
sidered copying an entire work, and whether a personal use exemp-
tion exists under copyright law.
Finally, the Article concludes that either the courts must recog-
nize, or Congress should enact, a personal use exemption that
would allow workplace and other consumers of information to
make single copies of copyrighted materials without obtaining the
copyright owner's permission or paying any royalty or licensing
fees. Furthermore, courts should reject a purely economic ap-
proach to fair use for the doctrine to remain viable as a check
against the marketing schemes of copyright owners.
I. PHOTOCOPYING AND THE COURTS
By the early 1960s, photocopying machines had evolved to the
point where they could provide fast, cheap, and high quality cop-
ies.46 Since then, copyright owners have predicted that if left un-
checked, copying technology could spell ruin for the value of their
copyrights and cause many areas of the publishing industry to dete-
riorate.47 As shown in the following summary, courts have general-
46. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 79. For a review of the history of reprography,
see WILLIAM Z. NASRI, CRISIS IN COPYRIGHT 5-7 (1976).
47. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1369 (Ct. Cl.
1973) (Cowen, C.J., dissenting) ("A representative of Williams & Wilkins Company
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ly, although not always, agreed with copyright owners that
photoduplication technology constitutes an unacceptable threat to
their exclusive rights.
A. Copying for Educational Purposes Favored as Fair Use
The preamble to Section 107 of the 1976 Act specifically in-
cludes teaching and "multiple copies for classroom use" within the
boundaries of fair use.4" Accordingly, educational uses are general-
ly favored under a fair use analysis, although the cases have been
anything but uniform in reasoning or result.
In a recent and controversial decision of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc. ,49 the court applied the fair use defense to an instance
of educational photocopying even when the resultant copies were
testified that in recent years there have been journals that have failed, and in the opinion
of those at Williams & Wilkins, photocopying has played a role in these failures."), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
1511-18 (1965) (statement of Williams & Wilkins Co., requesting language in the Copy-
right Revision Bill that would require users to obtain publisher permission before making
photocopies that could interfere with publishers' revenues); Survey of Copyrighted Mate-
rial Reproduction Practices in Scientific and Technical Fields, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 69, 86-87 (1963) (finding that larger publishers complained about photocopying
of their copyrighted material, even if no economic harm could be shown); Melville B.
Nimmer, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and Computers, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 931, 951 (1968) (stating that machine copying will create significant
economic harm to authors).
Courts and commentators have made the same prediction. See, e.g., American
Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 917 ("As with the development of other easy and accessible
means of mechanical reproduction of documents, the invention and widespread availability
of photocopying technology threatens to disrupt the delicate balances established by the
Copyright Act."), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 29
(arguing that technological developments such as xerography threaten to undermine the
copyright law's system of incentives); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[E][1], at 13-246 (1995) [hereinafter NIMMER] (warning
that "unrestricted photocopying practices could largely undercut the entire law of copy-
right").
48. 17 U.S.C. 107; see also supra note 17.
49. 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, vacated, and reh'g en banc granted,
74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996). As this Article went into publication, the Sixth Circuit had
vacated and withdrawn its opinion and granted a rehearing en banc.
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sold for a profit.50 In that case, several publishers sued Michigan
Document Services ("MDS"), a copy shop operator, for copyright
infringement relating to MDS's its compilation and sale of
"coursepacks. ' ' 51 By producing these coursepacks, MDS allowed
college professors to create personalized, albeit photocopied, an-
thologies for their students.5 1 Pursuant to the professor's instruc-
tions, MDS would photocopy selected excerpts from copyrighted
and uncopyrighted materials, bundle the copies into course packets,
and sell the packets directly to students.53 The plaintiffs argued
that by copying and reselling copyrighted excerpts without either
obtaining authorization or paying the standard permission fees,
MDS engaged in a nontransformative, commercial, competitive,
and therefore infringing use. 4
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, characterizing the primary purpose
of the use as "nonprofit educational. 55 According to the court, the
professors and their students could have copied the material them-
selves without violating the copyright law.56 Therefore, the court
reasoned, the ultimate users are free to delegate the duplication task
to a third party without changing the nature of the use.57 Although
MDS profited by performing this task, the court, nevertheless,
found that MDS did not "exploit" the plaintiff's copyrights because
the copy shop charged the same per-page fee to reproduce both
copyrighted and uncopyrighted material.58
Having determined that the defendant's use of the copyrighted
material was noncommercial, the court placed the burden of proof
on the plaintiffs to show economic harm under the fourth fair use
factor.5 9 The court concluded that the defendant's use created no
50. Id. at 1515.
51. Id. at 1516.
52. Id. at 1517.
53. Id. at 1516. Specifically at issue in the case were six excerpts, ranging from 17
to 95 pages in length and constituting as much as 30 percent of an entire book, to which
the plaintiffs owned the copyrights. Id.
54. id. at 1517.
55. Id. at 1521.
56. id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. id. at 1523.
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damage to the market for the original works despite the plaintiffs'
evidence of lost permission fees.6° Proof of lost permission fees,
the court said, is irrelevant regarding market effect because "[i]t is
circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefore required,
on the basis that the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee.
' 6
'
MDS had obtained affidavits from the professors who chose the
excerpts at issue, stating that they would not have assigned the
original copyrighted works to their classes had coursepacks been
unavailable.62 As a result, the court held that the publishers had
failed to show any damage to the market for the original copyright-
ed works.63
As an additional factor in its fair use analysis, the court relied
on declarations from more than 100 authors to the effect that pecu-
niary reward does not constitute the major incentive for their
work.6 Accordingly, the court said that the copy shop's actions in
duplicating and reselling the excerpts without compensating the
copyright owners would not discourage, but instead would actually
stimulate the production of scholarly works.65
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Michigan Document Services
stands in stark contrast to a 1991 holding by a Manhattan district
court on almost identical facts. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp.,' the court rejected defendant Kinko's argument
that the anthologies were compiled for educational purposes.67
Instead, the court determined that Kinko's chief purpose in creating
course packets was to profit from the sale of the unauthorized cop-
ies.68 Furthermore, the court noted that Kinko's did not use the
copyrighted materials in a "productive" or "transformative" way,
in the sense that the copy shop added nothing of value to the origi-
nal works.69 The court thus concluded that the photocopying did
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1522.
63. Id. at 1523.
64. Id. at 1524.
65. Id.
66. 758 F. Supp 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
67. Id. at 1530-31.
68. Id. at 1531.
69. Id. at 1530. By comparison, the Sixth Circuit in Michigan Document Services
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not qualify as a fair use because the copies both substituted for and
competed with the original copyrighted works, with "the intended
purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's commercially valu-
able right."70
Although Michigan Document Services, being a court of ap-
peals decision, is theoretically entitled to more precedential weight
than the district court decision in the Kinko's case, immediate re-
sponse to the Sixth Circuit's ruling has been negative.71 In fact,
the weight of prior case authority dealing with educational copying
supports the Kinko's analysis. For example, in an early case in-
volving educational copying, Wihtol v. Crow,72 a music teach-
er/church choir director was found guilty of copyright infringement
under the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act") 73 for making a cho-
ral arrangement of a copyrighted song, and then making forty-eight
copies on a school duplicating machine of this arrangement for
choir members and students.74 Although the district court agreed
with the choirmaster that his use of the song for educational pur-
poses and without intent to infringe was a fair use,75 the Court of
Appeals reversed.76 While acknowledging that the defendant's
infringement was unintentional, the appellate court nevertheless
exclaimed that "it is not conceivable to us that the copying of all,
or substantially all, of a copyrighted song can be held to be a 'fair
use' merely because the infringer had no intent to infringe. 77
Another similar case involving educational copying, although
not photocopying per se, Marcus v. Rowley, 78 held that a teacher's
described the compilation of customized coursepacks as possessing "slight" transformative
value. 74 F.3d at 1520.
70. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1531 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
71. See e.g., Victoria Sling-Flor, Copyright Lawyers Razz Adverse 6th Circuit Ruling,
NAT'L L.J., March 4, 1996, at All.
72. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
73. Act of March 4, 1909, Ch. 230, 35 Stat. 1075.
74. Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 778-80.
75. Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D. Iowa 1961).
76. Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 783.
77. Id. at 780.
78. 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
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retyping of a substantial portion of another teacher's copyrighted
booklet was not a fair use, even though the copies were intended
for the classroom.79 In both cases, the fact that the copies were
made for educational purposes was not, by itself, sufficient to qual-
ify the copying as a fair use. In light of these precedents, it is
unclear how much weight should be accorded to the Michigan
Document Services decision.
B. Library Photocopying For Research Purposes Held to be
Fair Use
In another case brought under the 1909 Act, and the only pho-
tocopying case to be considered ° by the Supreme Court, Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States,81 a publisher of medical journals
claimed that the National Institute of Health ("NIH") and the Na-
tional Library of Medicine ("NLM") violated its copyrights by sys-
tematically making unauthorized photocopies of periodical articles
for free distribution to scientists and researchers.8 2 Despite copying
limits imposed by both libraries for each requester,s3 the total
amount of photocopying done by each entity was extensive."
Characterizing the defendants' activities as "wholesale copying"
that met "none of the criteria for 'fair use,' ' '8 5 the trial commission-
er of the Court of Claims8 6 ruled for the publisher.
79. Id. at 1179.
80. Although the Court heard oral arguments in the case, it did not render a decision
of precedential value. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
81. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975).
82. Id. at 1347. The NIH supplied photocopies only to its own employees, id. at
1354-55, while the NLM responded to requests from other libraries, government agencies,
and some commercial entities such as private drug companies. Id. at 1349. The court
noted that the researchers who received photocopied articles from the NIH generally kept
the copies in their files for later reference. Id. at 1348.
83. For example, both libraries would provide only one copy of a journal article per
request and both generally imposed a page limit of about fifty pages, although exceptions
were granted. Id. at 1348.
84. In 1970, the NIH filled 85,744 requests for copies of -articles, totalling approxi-
mately 930,000 pages. Id. In 1968, the NLM supplied about 120,000 requests for photo-
copies. Id. at 1349.
85. Williams & Wilkins, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670, 679 (Ct. Cl. 1972), pet. dismissed, 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
86. Because the publisher was suing the government, the case was heard in the Court
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The full seven-judge Court of Claims, however, rejected the
commissioner's recommendation and, in a 4-3 decision that empha-
sized the public interest in free access to medical knowledge, found
that the defendants' copying activities qualified as a fair use.87 In
reaching its decision, the court weighed not only the four fair use
criteria,88 but also a "multiplicity of factors"8 9 including custom and
practice. 90 Considering the nature of the use, the court stressed that
the copying was performed by non-profit institutions for the pur-
pose of furthering the personal, scientific research of the re-
questers. 91 The nature of the use, therefore, was "untainted by any
commercial gain ' 92 because neither the libraries nor the requesters
attempted to sell the duplicated articles.93
Because the libraries' photocopying activities furthered scientif-
ic progress, the court concluded that disallowing the
of Claims, the trial court for copyright lawsuits against the United States. Trial Commis-
sioner James F. Davis' opinion is reported at 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. CI. 1972).
87. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1362.
88. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. Although Williams & Wilkins
was decided under the 1909 Act, the Court of Claims applied the four fair use criteria that
were then part of the copyright revision package before Congress and are now codified
in Section 107 of the 1976 Act. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1361.
89. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353.
90. Id. The court stated that library photocopying had been widely accepted in the
industry for at least 50 years, and concluded as follows:
The fact that photocopying by libraries of entire articles was done with hardly
any (and at most very minor) complaint, until about 10 or 15 years ago, goes
a long way to show both that photoduplication cannot be designated as infringe-
ment per se, and that there was at least a time when photocopying, as then
carried on, was "fair use."
Id. at 1356.
91. Id. at 1354. With respect to the personal nature of the copying involved, the
Court of Claims presaged Chief Justice Burger's thoughts during oral arguments in the
same case when it stated:
We cannot believe . . . that a judge who makes and gives to a colleague a
photocopy of a law review article, in one of the smaller or less available jour-
nals, which bears directly on a problem both judges are then considering in a
case before them is infringing the copyright, rather than making "fair use" of
his issue of that journal.
Id. at 1353; see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
92. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354.
93. Id.
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photoduplication would impair the advance of medical research.'
Back issues of, and reprints from, these rarely used medical jour-
nals were scarce, and if photocopying were not permitted, the court
did not believe that either the scientists or the libraries would pur-
chase additional subscriptions. 95 Instead, the court assumed that
many researchers would simply "do without... many of the arti-
cles they now desire, need, and use in their work." As a result,
the court found the publisher had shown neither actual damages nor
that it would suffer substantial harm by the defendants' photocopy-
ing practices.97 In reaching this conclusion, the court discounted
evidence provided by the publisher regarding the effect of photo-
copying on its journals,98 and looked instead to the publisher's
overall general increases in revenues and subscription sales.99 The
court noted that the creators of the journal articles at issue certainly
were not harmed by the libraries' photocopying: almost none of
the authors who contributed to the plaintiff's journals were paid for
their work, and at least some of the authors said they supported
photocopying as a means to disseminate scientific data.t°°
Concerning royalty income, the court gave several justifica-
tions for rejecting the publisher's argument that loss of licensing
fees should be included in the court's calculation of harm. As a
threshold issue, the court reasoned that loss of royalty income
could not be a cognizable harm to plaintiff unless the defendants'
photocopying activities were first found not to qualify as a fair
use.01 The publisher here had no right to issue licenses, the court
said, unless the defendants' photocopying constituted copyright
94. Id. at 1356. The plaintiffs had asked the defendants to purchase a photocopy
license, however, critics of the decision have pointed out that the Court of Claims was not
being asked to stop the library's photocopying. id. at 1360; see PATRY, supra note 13,
at 180-81.
95. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1357.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The dissenters in the case noted that some of the plaintiff s journals had lost both
subscribers and revenues during the time period at issue. Id. at 1,370 (Cowen, C.J.,
dissenting).
99. Id. at 1357.
100. Id. at 1359.
101. Id. at 1357 n.19.
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infringement and was not a fair use. 10 2 If it accepted plaintiff's
argument that lost royalties should figure into the market effect
component of fair use, the court would be engaging in circular
reasoning. 103
Second, the majority doubted whether a workable licensing
system could be devised without legislation. ' 4  Structuring a
photoduplication licensing mechanism would raise manifest "eco-
nomic, social, and policy factors which are far better sifted by a
legislature."' 5
Finally, the court believed it lacked the power to impose com-
pulsory licensing under the 1909 Act.' °6 Therefore, any licensing
system developed without Congressional intervention would have
to be voluntary between the parties.1°7 The court said it was loath
to "turn the determination of 'fair use' on the owner's willingness
to license-to hold that photocopying (without royalty payments)
is not 'fair use' if the owner is willing to license at reasonable rates
.... ,,log Until Congress chose to clarify the "problems of photo-
copying,"' ° the court suggested publishers raise subscription rates
for institutions such as libraries that perform extensive photocopy-
ing. l l0
After hearing oral arguments in the case, the Supreme Court
split four-to-four to affirm the Court of Claims' decision,"' without
creating either a written opinion or a precedent." 2 Although the
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1357-58.
104. Id. at 1360. However, the dissent pointed out that the plaintiff had already
licensed the Institute of Scientific Information to provide copies of out-of-print articles
for a fee. Id. at 1370 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1360.
106. Id. But see NIMMER, supra note 47, at § 13.05[E][4][e], at 13-265 (stating that
the Court of Claims "may issue a mandatory license providing for just compensation to
the copyright claimant").
107. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1360.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1363.
110. Id. at 1360.
111. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Justice
Blackmun did not participate in the decision. Id.
112. When the Supreme Court deadlocks in this manner, the lower court decision
is automatically affirmed, although the affirmation has no precedential value. See Neil
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Williams & Wilkins decision has never been overruled, it has been
soundly criticized by both judges and commentators." 3 Congress
addressed the library photocopying problem in at least a limited
way when it enacted the 1976 Act.11 4
C. Newsletters Entitled to Greater Copyright Protection Than
Other Periodicals
In the first-published opinion concerning the photocopying of
newsletters," 5 Pasha Publications Inc. v. Enmark Gas Corp., a
v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 190-92 (1972) (holding that an affirmance by an equally divided
Court is not entitled to precedential weight); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 758
(4th ed. 1983).
113. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1387 (Ct.
Cl. 1973) (Nichols, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]e are making the Dred Scott decision
of copyright law"); NIMMER, supra note 47, § 13.05 [E][4][c], at 13-256 (concluding that
the decision was "seriously in error"); PATRY, supra note 13, at 180 (describing the deci-
sion as out of line with traditional fair use analysis); Paul Goldstein, The Private Con-
sumption of Public Goods: A Comment on Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 21
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 204, 210-11 (1974) (stating that the fair use determination was
not justified in Williams & Wilkins despite potential high transaction costs of negotiating
photocopy licenses). But see Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use
in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 233, 252 (1988) (arguing Williams & Wilkins
finding of fair use justified based on "sensitivity to copyright policy").
114. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994). Section 108 of that Act authorizes libraries and their
employees to make and distribute single copies of copyrighted works as long as: (1) the
copies are made without direct or indirect commercial motivation; (2) the libraries are
open to the public or available to researchers in a specialized field other than those of the
libraries' parent organization; and (3) the copies made include a copyright notice. Id. §
108(a).
Additionally, libraries are protected from infringement liability for patrons who make
their own photocopies on self-service equipment as long as the libraries' photocopiers
carry a copyright warning notice. Id. § 108(f)(1). Section 108 makes clear that libraries
may still use Section 107's fair use provision to protect photocopying activities that are
not covered by Section 108. Id. § 108(0(4).
For a full discussion of library photocopying, see ARLENE BIELEFIELD & LAWRENCE
CHEESEMAN, LIBRARIES & COPYRIGHT LAW (1993); James M. Treece, Library Photo-
copying, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1976).
115. For a similar case involving the photocopying of an industry newsletter, see
Television Digest, Inc. v. United States Tel. Assoc., 841 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1993). Other
newsletter publishers upset over unauthorized photocopying have filed copyright infringe-
ment suits that have been settled. For example, in 1991, publisher Washington Business
Information Inc. (WBII) sued a Washington, D.C. law firm for making unauthorized
photocopies of the weekly newsletter Product Safety Letter. Washington Business Info.
Inc. v. Collier, Shannon & Scott, No. 91-0305-A.(E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1991). Upon the law
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federal district court in 1992 found a for-profit gas company guilty
of copyright infringement for making unauthorized, multiple, cover-
to-cover photocopies of "Gas Daily."'1 17 The business, Enmark Gas
Corporation, received one copy of the newsletter by subscription at
its Dallas office." 8 Not only did the company make a practice of
circulating photocopies of the newsletter among its Dallas employ-
ees, it also transmitted copies by facsimile to employees in two
branch offices.1 9
In applying the four statutory factors' 20 to determine if
Enmark's photocopying constituted fair use, the court concluded
that none of the criteria favored Enmark.12 ' First, regarding the
nature and purpose of the use, the court found that Enmark, a com-,
mercial entity, made the photocopies "in furtherance of its commer-
cial pursuits."' 22  The use of copyrighted works for commercial,
as opposed to educational, scientific or research, purposes tradition-
ally has not been favored as a fair use. 23
Second, the court emphasized that the nature of the copyrighted
work was a newsletter-a type of publication given more protec-
tion against copyright infringement than other periodicals or jour-
nals. 24 In the legislative history of Section 107, the House drafting
committee indicated that although photocopying a newsletter did
not automatically constitute copyright infringement, the relatively
firm's agreement to cease photocopying WBII's newsletter and to make a cash settlement,
the lawsuit was settled and dismissed. Copyrights: Law Firm is Sued for Copying News-
letter for In-House Use, 41 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1021, at 389
(March 7, 1991) (discussing Washington Bus. case). For reports of this and other lawsuits
brought by newsletter publishers, see Don J. DeBenedictis, Saving on Subscriptions,
A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 32.
116. 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2062 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
117. Id. at 2062-63.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
121. Pasha Publications, 19 Media L. Rep. at 2063.
122. Id. The judge did not inquire into the ultimate use of the photocopies, but
instead assumed that they were used for commercial purposes based on the for-profit
status of the defendant. Id.
123. See infra notes 272-90 and accompanying text.
124. Pasha Publications, 19 Media L. Rep. at 2063.
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small size, narrow focus, and modest circulation of newsletters
made them especially vulnerable to mass duplication.' 2' Therefore,
the committee concluded that the fair use exception should be nar-
rower for newsletters than for other types of publications. 26
Because Enmark photocopied the entire newsletter, the court
held that the third fair use factor-amount and substantiality of the
use-also cut against fair use. 127  Finally, the court stated that
Enmark avoided purchasing additional subscriptions of the newslet-
ter by its photocopying, thereby creating "an obvious detrimental
effect on the potential market for 'Gas Daily. ' '"1 2' For these rea-
sons, and despite the finding that Enmark was an unintentional
infringer,129 its copying activities did not qualify as a fair use. 30
The court permanently enjoined Enmark, its officers, directors,
agents, and employees from any further copyright infringement
with respect to plaintiffs publications.1
3 1
In summary, these judicial decisions show how unsettled the
law remains regarding the photocopying of copyrighted material.
Although Michigan Document Services expanded the doctrine of
fair use in an educational context, it is unclear whether the decision
will prove to be a long-lasting victory for copy shop operators.
125. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 73-74, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5687. The House Report goes on to address newsletter photocopying and fair use as
follows:
Whether the copying of portions of a newsletter is an act of infringement or a
fair use will necessarily turn on the facts of the individual case. However, as
a general principle, it seems clear that the scope of the fair use doctrine should
be considerably narrower in the case of newsletters than in that of either mass-
circulation periodicals or scientific journals. The commercial nature of the user
is a significant factor in such cases: Copying by a profit-making user of even
a small portion of a newsletter may have a significant impact on the
commercial market for the work.
Id.
126. Id.
127. Pasha Publications, 19 Media L. Rep. at 2063.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2062.
130. Id. at 2063. In fact, the court stated that "[riegardless of the number of photo-
copies reproduced, Enmark Gas' repeated, unauthorized, cover-to-cover photocopying of
'Gas Daily'.. . did not qualify as a fair use." Id.
131. Id.
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Other cases, such as Kinko's and Wihtol, have denied fair use treat-
ment to photocopying even in the educational setting. Library
photocopying for scientific research purposes was held to be a fair
use in Williams & Wilkins; however, this case has also been de-
scribed as dubious authority.13 2 Finally, the legislative history of
Section 107 grants newsletters special protection against photo-
copying, 33 making it unlikely that any cover-to-cover duplication
of a newsletter would qualify as fair use. These cases leave unad-
dressed, however, the question of whether spontaneous copying of
single articles by a scientist employed by a for-profit corporation
would constitute copyright infringement. That question was pre-
sented to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the American
Geophysical case.
II. AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION V. TEXACO, INC.
In the early 1980s, Texaco's in-house library at its Beacon,
New York research center circulated scientific journals among its
researchers in a manner that is most likely familiar among law
firms and corporations. 134 Those Texaco scientists interested in
reviewing specific journals put their names on the appropriate rout-
ing lists, and as the journals were received, the library staff circu-
lated the journals to the listed employees.1 35 At least one Texaco
researcher, Dr. Donald Chickering, II, photocopied or had his secre-
tary photocopy four articles, two notes, and two letters to the editor
from various issues of the Journal of Catalysis ("Catalysis"), pub-
lished by Academic Press.136
In 1985, a group of CCC-member journal publishers (including
132. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 73-74, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5687.
134. Speaking from personal experience, I know that this was standard practice at
Vinson & Elkins' Houston office when I worked there at approximately the same time.
135. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 915 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
136. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff'd, 60 F.3d. 913 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995). Both the
district and the appellate court referred to these various items as "articles."
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Academic Press) filed a class action copyright infringement lawsuit
against Texaco, claiming Texaco's employees were making unau-
thorized photocopies of journal articles to use in their research.137
By stipulation, the parties agreed to focus on the photocopying of
one Texaco researcher chosen at random-Dr. Chickering-and
selected from his files the photocopies of the eight items from
Catalysis.138  The district court held that Dr. Chickering's photo-
copying was not a fair use, and therefore found Texaco guilty of
copyright infringement. 139 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, stating that its decision did not reach the issue of "pho-
tocopying for personal use by an individual," but rather was limited
to "the institutional, systematic, archival multiplication of copies
revealed by the record."'14 In reaching its conclusion, the Court of
Appeals found that three of the four statutory fair use factors sup-
ported the publishers.
14
'
Section 1976 Act by its language requires courts to consider at
least all four statutory factors in making fair use determinations.142
Although approximately ten years ago the Supreme Court stated
that the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work
constituted the most important of the four fair use factors,143 it has
more recently backed away from that position. According to the
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,144 "[aill [four factors]
are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright."'145  The following section of this Article
assesses each of the four fair use factors in turn and reviews the
137. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., No. 85-3446 (S.D.N.Y. filed May
6, 1985).
138. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 915.
139. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 28.
140. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931.
141. Id.
142. The statute indicates that these four factors are not necessarily exhaustive. This
is the case because the preamble to Section 107 states that in determining whether a use
is fair, the factors to be considered shall "include" those listed in the statute. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. The term "including" is defined in Section 101 as "illustrative and not limitative."
17 U.S.C. § 101.
143. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
144. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
145. Id. at 1171.
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Second Circuit's analysis in the American Geophysical case.
A. Factor 1: The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use factor directs that courts evaluate the purpose
and character of the secondary use, including whether the use is
"commercial" in nature.1 " In considering the purpose and charac-
ter of Dr. Chickering's use of the photocopied materials, the court
gave primary importance to the concept of "transformative use."' 47
Noting the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell, the Second
Circuit stated that transformative uses-those that build on or add
something new to the original work-promote the advance of
knowledge and further the goals of copyright. 48  On the other
hand, nontransformative uses-uses that do no more than duplicate
the original work-generate no new "value" and therefore provide
little justification for a finding of fair use. 149
In evaluating Dr. Chickering's duplicating practices, the court
focused on what it called the "archival" nature of the copying. 0
146. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994); see supra note 17.
147. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 920. Courts and commentators have used the
phrase "productive use" interchangeably with "transformative use." Compare Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
"fair use has traditionally involved what might be termed the 'productive use' of copy-
righted material"), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) with Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (equating "transformative value" with
the phrase "productive use"); see also Leval supra note 21, at 1111 (defining
transformative use as one that is "productive and ... employ[s] the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original"). For simplicity's sake, this
Article uses the phrase "transformative use" as including "productive use."
148. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 923. In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated
that a proper inquiry into the first fair use factor involved asking "whether and to what
extent the new work is 'transformative,"' 114 S. Ct. at 1171. However, in Campbell,
which was a parody case, a new work was in question. id.
149. American Geophysical, 60 F. 3d at 923-24. This approach echoes Judge Leval's
belief that to be a fair use, "[t]he use must be productive and must employ the quoted
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original." Leval, supra
note 21, at 1111.
For a history and criticism of the Transformative Use doctrine, see generally Laura
G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58
ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995).
150. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 919-20. Although the court said that some
instances of archival copying might qualify as fair use, Dr. Chickering's copying did not
because it was "part of a systematic process of encouraging employee researchers to copy
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Dr. Chickering photocopied the articles, the court said, to file with-
in easy reach should he need them for future reference.15' The
court deemed this type of copying to be nontransformative because
the duplicated articles simply sat on Dr. Chickering's shelf as extra,
free clones of the original subscription copies. 15 2  Although the
court admitted that Dr. Chickering converted the articles into a
more useful format by photocopying them,153 the court said the
primary purpose of the copying remained archival, and therefore,
nontransformative i
5 4
The court also considered Texaco's for-profit status as influen-
tial in evaluating the nature and purpose of Dr. Chickering's use of
the copyrighted works.155  Although Texaco argued that Dr.
Chickering copied the works to advance his research, a use that the
preamble to Section 107 lists as presumptively fair, 56 the court
looked instead to the profit motivation behind the research.' Not-
ing that Section 107(1) distinguishes between commercial and non-
articles so as to multiply available copies while avoiding payment." Id. at 920.
151. Id. at 918-19. The court found it significant that Dr. Chickering had not yet had
opportunity to use five of the eight articles. Id.
152. 'The photocopying merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation,
and tilts the first factor against Texaco." Id. at 919-20 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(C.C.D. Mass, 1841) (No. 4,901))).
153. "[P]hotocopying the article separated it from a bulky journal, made it more
amenable to markings, and provided a document that could be readily replaced if dam-
aged in a laboratory .. " Id. at 920.
154. Id. at 923-24. Had Dr. Chickering purchased his own copy of Catalysis (or had
Texaco bought it for him) and photocopied a chart or formula to take with him into the
laboratory rather than to keep in his files, the court said he might have been engaging in
the kind of "spontaneous" copying that would qualify as a fair use. Id. at 919. However,
the court did not explain why the purchase of an additional subscription would change the
nature of the use; clearly, the use in both instances remains the same.
155, Id. at 921-22.
156, In pertinent part, the preamble to Section 107 states that: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.
157. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 922. ("[Ilt is overly simplistic to suggest that
the 'purpose and character of the use' can be fully discerned without considering the
nature and objectives of the user.").
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profit educational use,1 58 the court said the proper inquiry involves
whether "a secondary user makes unauthorized use of copyrighted
material to capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of
copying the original work." 159
Recognizing that Dr. Chickering's copying could eventually
"serve a broader public purpose," 16° the court concluded that his
copying did not amount to pure "commercial exploitation" of the
copyrighted articles.1 6' However, the court refused to consider the
copying as pure research either, for two reasons. First, the link
between Dr. Chickering's copying and his scientific investigations
was seen as too indirect for the court to consider the copying as
any more than an "intermediate use" 162-a mere step in the re-
search chain. According to the court, too many maybe's, might's,
and could's existed between Dr. Chickering's copying and any
measurable scientific progress. 163 Second, because Dr. Chickering
158. Section 107(1) lists "the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" as a factor
to be considered in a fair use determination. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
159. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 922. In evaluating Texaco's for-profit status
in its fair use analysis, the court noted that the Supreme Court in Campbell, 114 S. Ct.
at 1171, did away with the notion that any commercial use is presumptively unfair, and
instead explained that the commercial nature of the user simply "tends to weigh against
a finding of fair use." American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 921 (citing Campbell, 114 S.
Ct. at 1174).
160. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 922.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 921. In using this phrase, the court quoted Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1992), where a software manufacturer's copying
of a competing computer program was held to be a fair use because the copying constitut-
ed an intermediate step in the development of the company's own, original product. For
a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
163. "Texaco's photocopying served, at most, to facilitate Chickering's research,
which in turn might have led to the development of new products and technology that
could have improved Texaco's commercial performance." American Geophysical, 60 F.3d
at 921 (emphases added).
In a footnote, the court further explained its reasoning as follows:
Though Texaco claims that its copying is for "research" as that term is used in
the preamble of section 107, this characterization might somewhat overstate the
matter. Chickering has not used portions of articles from Catalysis in his own
published piece of research, nor has he had to duplicate some portion of copy-
righted material directly in the course of conducting an experiment or investiga-
tion. Rather, entire articles were copied as an intermediate step that might abet
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conducted research in hopes of developing profitable products for
Texaco, the court characterized his photocopying as just another
production expense for the company."6 Texaco developed new
products to reap private economic rewards; any benefits that may
have filtered to the public were merely incidental. 65 "Conceptual-
ized in this way," the court said, "it is not obvious why it is fair
for Texaco to avoid having to pay at least some price to copyright
holders for the right to photocopy the original articles."'166 Ulti-
mately, the court related Texaco's for-profit status back to the dis-
tinction between transformative and nontransformative use. Quot-
ing again from Campbell, the court said that "the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use."' 67  Archival photocopying does not become a
transformative use just because it is done in the course of conduct-
ing research, despite the wording of the preamble to Section 107.168
That language, according to the court, refers "to the work of au-
thorship alleged to be a fair use, not to the activity in which the
alleged infringer is engaged."'' 69 Here, where the court regarded
Dr. Chickering's photoduplication as having produced no original
work of authorship, 70 the importance of Texaco's commercial na-
ture in the fair use mix was apparently quite significant.' 71
Finally, Texaco relied on Williams & Wilkins 172 to argue that
the widespread practice of photocopying of journal articles consti-
Chickering' s research.
Id. at 920 n.7.
164. Id. at 922.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 921 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171
(1994)).
168. Id. at 924.
169. Id.
170. "Mechanical 'copying' of an entire document, made readily feasible and eco-
nomical by the advent of xerography... is obviously an activity entirely different from
creating a work of authorship." Id. at 917 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 921 ("We do not consider Texaco's status as a for-profit company irrele-
vant to the fair use analysis.").
172. Id. at 924.
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tuted a reasonable and customary use for the purposes of the first
factor.'73 The court swiftly disposed of this claim, stating that
although the practice may have been reasonable and customary in
1973 when Williams & Wilkins was decided, such was no longer
the case. 74  The court attributed the difference squarely to the
dawn of photocopying licensing systems, a development that the
court felt rendered Texaco's "everybody does it" argument irrele-
vant. 175
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jacobs took issue with the
court's conclusion that Dr. Chickering's photocopying did not rise
to the level of "research" as that term is used in the preamble to
Section 107.176 Judge Jacobs said that scientific research means
more than just laboratory experiments, and necessarily begins and
continues with an evaluation of what others have done through a
literature review of the relevant journals. 77 According to the dis-
sent, making single photocopies to assist with research and scholar-
ship qualified as a reasonable and customary use that served Dr.
Chickering as the functional equivalent of note-taking. 178 As such,
the dissent characterized Dr. Chickering's copying as a necessary
first step in any scientific enquiry, done by him for a
transformative purpose, rather than a commercial one. 79
B. Factor 2: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Under the second statutory fair use factor, "the nature of the
copyrighted work,"' 80 the court noted that the extent of copyright
protection generally is broader with respect to fictional than to
factual works.' 81 Despite the publishers' argument that the eight
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 932 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 932-33.
178. "What Dr. Chickering does is simply a technologically assisted form of note-
taking, such as has long been customary among researchers .. " Id. at 934 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
179. Id. at 935. Dr. Chickering's copying was seen as noncommercial by the dissent
because "the articles are not re-sold or retailed in any way." Id.
180. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2); see supra note 17.
181. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 925. The Supreme Court has embraced this
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Catalysis articles were examples of intensely creative and original
thought, the court characterized the articles as primarily factual.'82
Therefore, the court concluded that the second fair use factor fa-
vored Texaco.' 83
C. Factor 3: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion
Used
The third statutory factor requires an assessment of "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."' 184 To determine how much of the copyrighted
work Dr. Chickering used by photocopying the eight articles, the
court looked first at what made up the "copyrighted work.' 185
Because Catalysis is sold only in issue format, Texaco argued that
the copyrighted work in this instance should be the relevant issues
of Catalysis'86 -in which case, the amount of Dr. Chickering's
copying in each issue (one article of between two-to-twenty pages)
would be relatively slight compared to an average issue size of 200
pages. 87 While the court described this argument as "superficially
intriguing,"'188 the court considered it more important that as a con-
dition of publication, each author was required to transfer his or her
copyright to Academic Press.'89 Citing Williams & Wilkins, the
court sided with the publishers' claim that each article in the jour-
nal was a separate, copyrighted work.' 9° Because each article was
regarded as an original, copyrighted work of authorship, and be-
dichotomy. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
563 (1985) ("The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works
than works of fiction or fantasy."). For a thorough discussion of the fact/fiction distinc-
tion, see Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560 (1982).
182. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 925.
183. Id.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3); see supra note 17.
185. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 925.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 915.
188. Id. at 926.
189. Id.
190. Id. "The only other appellate court to consider the propriety of photocopying
articles from journals also recognized that each article constituted an entire work in the
fair use analysis." Id. (citing Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353).
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cause Dr. Chickering copied the eight articles in their entireties, the
court found the third factor was detrimental to Texaco.' 9'
D. Factor 4: Effect of the Use Upon Potential Market or
Value
The fourth fair use factor addresses "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."1 92 The
court began its analysis of the fourth fair use factor by noting that
writers of scholarly journal articles often neither receive nor expect
any reward for their work besides prestige, personal satisfaction,
and the chance for professional advancement. 93 In this instance,
therefore, the court recognized that the financial returns offered by
copyright law did not encourage the creation of new works-these
authors will continue their research and writing with or without
payment. 194 However, the incentives provided by copyright law
indirectly achieve the advance of science, the court said, by moti-
vating publishers to produce journals that disseminate the authors'
work.195 As a result, the court considered the monetary effect of
the photocopying on potential markets for the publisher, not the
author, of scholarly articles.' 96
The court looked at two potential publishers' markets for jour-
nal articles in calculating the market effect of Texaco's photocopy-
ing: (1) the market in additional journal subscriptions, back issues,
and back volumes; and (2) the market in licensing revenues and
fees.' 97 Evidence presented at trial established that, had Texaco
been prohibited from photocopying the articles in question, it
would have purchased no more than a small number of additional
subscriptions to Catalysis.'98 According to the court, this minimal
191. Id.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); see supra note 17.
193. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 927. In fact, Catalysis paid nothing to the
authors of the eight articles in question. Id. at 915.
194. Id. at 927.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 928. Because the court saw the primary purpose of Dr. Chickering's
copying as archival, the court said it was reasonable to conclude that Texaco would buy
a few additional subscriptions to provide certain researchers with personal copies of
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market effect, by itself, would tilt the fourth factor only somewhat
in the publishers' favor.199
The court found a very different result, however, when it con-
sidered the market effect of photocopying on publishers' potential
licensing revenues. The dissent, supporting Texaco, argued that by
considering these licensing revenues as part of the fair use analysis,
the court erroneously assumed the ultimate question in issue-that
Dr. Chickering's photocopying was not a fair use.20°  The court
disagreed, saying that because Section 106 of the 1976 Act gives
the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce and,distribute
copies of copyrighted works,21 the copyright owner has an "indis-
putable" right to demand royalties for licensing others to use those
works.202 Although the court allowed that not every adverse effect
on potential licensing schemes should figure into the evaluation of
the fourth factor, the court said that the impact on potential licens-
ing revenues for "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed
markets" was appropriate.2 3
Did a traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market
exist for Texaco to purchase the right to photocopy individual arti-
cles from the Catalysis? The court said it did, pointing primarily
to the CCC.2 4 Fully embracing the economic theory of fair use,205
the court stated that what once may have been a fair use of copy-
righted material becomes "less fair" when a way to pay for the use
develops. 206 Essentially because the photocopying resulted in lost
Catalysis. Id. at 928 n.15.
199. Id. at 929.
200. Id. at 929, 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1),(3) (1994); see infra note 375.
202. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 929.
203. Id. at 929-30.
204. Id. The court repeated the district court's language that Texaco could have: (1)
obtained articles from document delivery services; (2) negotiated individual photocopy
licenses directly from various publishers; or (3) purchased a photocopying license from
the CCC. Id. at 929.
Although the court admitted that the publishers had not created a "conventional"
market for individual articles, the court characterized the licensing scheme developed by
the CCC as both "workable" and "viable." Id. at 930.
205. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
206. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931.
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licensing revenue to Academic Press, a loss that the court felt con-
stituted a "substantial harm" to the value of the publishers' copy-
rights, the court held that the fourth factor did not support a finding
of fair use.20
7
The dissent disagreed regarding the viability of the market in
photocopy licenses.208 It noted that only about 30 percent of the
journals subscribed to by Texaco would be covered under a CCC
license, and that not every article in CCC-member publications
were copyrighted at all.209 Regarding Dr. Chickering's photocopy-
ing, the dissent found it significant that Academic Press already
received additional revenue from Texaco by charging institutional
users twice the regular subscription rate for its journals. 2'0 Further-
more, the dissent noted that the imposition of an additional charge
on scientific inquiry to benefit journal publishers would not stimu-
late the creativity of the original authors, who give away their work
in search of professional recognition and satisfaction.2 '
207. Id. (quoting American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 21). The court also found
legislative support for the legitimacy of photocopying licenses, first by arguing that
because Congress explicitly limited the right of libraries to make photocopies in Section
108 of the 1976 Act, it thereby implied that journal publishers may restrict the photo-
copying activities of other entities by charging royalties. Id. Second, the court noted that
the CCC was formed upon the suggestion of Congress. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 983, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1974); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1975); H.R.
REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1968)).
208. Id. at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
209. Id. ("It follows that no CCC license can assure a scientist that photocopying
any given article is legal."). Even should Texaco purchase a photocopy license, the
dissent pointed out, it will still have to negotiate separately with many individual publish-
ers before its scientists are free to copy all materials in the Texaco library. Id. For this
reason, the dissent characterized the photocopy license market as "cumbersome and
unrealized." Id. at 939.
210. Id. at 936. ("The publisher must therefore assume that, unless they are reading
Catalysis for pleasure or committing it to memory, the scientists will extract what they
need and arrange to copy it for personal use before passing along the institutional cop-
ies.").
211. Id. at 939-40. To the dissent, the growth in the scientific journal industry
indicated that current incentives were sufficient to ensure the continued publication. of
journals, without additional compensation to publishers through photocopy royalties. Id.
at 940.
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In sum, the court found three of the four fair use factors-the
nature of the work, the amount copied, and the effect on the poten-
tial market for the copyrighted work-to favor the publishers'
claim of copyright infringement. Although the court said that the
existence of a photocopy license system was not conclusive on its
findings, careful examination shows that the court applied a mar-
ket analysis to each of these three factors. As will be shown in the
next section of this Article, the court in effect "triple-counted" the
fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use on the potential market
for the copyrighted work, and virtually ensured that Texaco's use
was not a fair one.
III. UNSETTLED ISSUES AFTER AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL
While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals purported to evalu-
ate Texaco's copying activities in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Campbell,213 this section of the Article argues that the
American Geophysical court instead emphasized market factors in
its fair use analysis. In applying a strictly economic approach to
copyright, the court left various questions unaddressed or, at least,
insufficiently answered. This section examines those unexplored
or inadequately addressed issues, including whether intermediate
copying should be considered transformative "research" within the
meaning of Section 107, whether copying one article from a collec-
tive work should be considered copying an entire work, and wheth-
er a personal use exemption exists under copyright law. In resolv-
ing these issues, this Article takes the position that the purpose of
copyright law-the advancement of learning-must be considered
in the context of personal and workplace copying, as well as the
market effect of the unauthorized use. The Article concludes that
the court's marketplace approach distorted the fair use balance in
212. Id. at 931.
213. Id. at 918, 921. In Campbell, the Supreme Court applied a "sensitive balancing
of interests" standard with respect to fair use, rather than a purely economic approach.
114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984)).
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favor of the economic interests of the copyright owners, giving
insufficient regard to the purposes of copyright.
A. Assessing the Intermediate/Transformative Dichotomy
The preamble to Section 107 lists certain examples of fair use
purposes, including "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching-
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search., 214 In American Geophysical, Texaco argued that Dr.
Chickering photocopied articles as part of his ongoing research, a
use singled out by the preamble as a favored one.2 5 The Second
Circuit dismissed this argument in a footnote, saying that Dr.
Chickering's copying did not rise to the level of true research be-
cause it was merely an intermediate step in his investigations.216
The court then devoted the bulk of its analysis under factor one to
discussing whether Dr. Chickering's copying constituted a
transformative use, holding that it did not.217 In the court's opin-
ion, the nontransformative nature of the use increased the impor-
tance of Texaco's for-profit status.218 Because the photocopying
assisted Texaco in developing profitable products, the court said it
was reasonable to require Texaco to provide extra compensation to
the copyright owners. 9
Three flaws are apparent in the court's reasoning. First, the
court assumed that photocopying is too far removed from scholarly
writing or laboratory experimentation to be part of legitimate re-
search. Second, the court failed to consider thoroughly whether
such an intermediate step could be transformative-that is, instru-
mental in either creating new works of authorship, or in serving a
socially beneficial purpose. Finally, the court wrongly categorized
Dr. Chickering's workplace photocopying as a commercial use,
based not on the nature of the use itself, but rather on the for-profit
status of the user.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
215. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 920.
216. Id. at 920 n.7.
217. Id. at 922-24.
218. Id. at 922-23.
219. Id. at 922.
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1. Photocopying as "Research"
"Research" has been defined as "careful, systematic, patient
study and investigation in some field of knowledge, undertaken to
discover or establish facts or principles. '220 Library research is an
integral part of any scientific investigation; in fact, scientific jour-
nals have been called the "life blood of research., 22' For instance,
graduate students are taught that a thorough literature review is the
first step in any original research project.222 The district court
opinion in American Geophysical summarized the symbiotic rela-
tionship between scientific journals and creative research as fol-
lows:
Learned journals play an important part in scientific re-
search. They serve to disseminate broadly and with reason-
able rapidity the results of scientific research being conduct-
ed in many places. It is of great importance for scientists
doing research to keep abreast of the publication of such
articles for many reasons. The reasons include awareness
of new learning, suggestion of new ideas and approaches,
avoidance of duplication of experimentation that have been
demonstrated to be fruitless, adoption for productive re-
search of findings that have resulted from the research of
others, and other valuable uses too numerous and varied to
221
mention.
In rejecting Texaco's claim that Dr. Chickering photocopied
journal articles as part of his ongoing research, the Second Circuit
emphasized that Dr. Chickering had not yet used the articles in his
own writings or laboratory work.224 This raises the question of
whether research includes photoduplication of articles only if the
220. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1208 (2d College ed. 1978).
221. NASRI, supra note 46, at 101. Nasri's book goes on to quote a witness in the
case of Williams & Wilkins who testified that "[r]esearch without communication is
useless," and stressed the importance of "consulting the prior literature." Id. (citation
omitted).
222. ROBERT V. SMITH, GRADUATE RESEARCH: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS IN THE
SCIENCES 96 (2d ed. 1990).
223. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 4.
224. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 920 n.7.
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articles are actually used. If so, what would constitute a "use" of
the copyrighted material? Would Dr. Chickering's photocopying
have risen to the level of research had he made marginal notes or
underlined significant bits of the articles' text?225  Or would he
have had to actually cite the work in a piece of his original writ-
ing?
None of these questions were posed or answered by the court.
Clearly, scholars who make handwritten notes from journal articles
are unquestionably engaged in research, whether or not they use the
notes in their work, file them for future reference, or discard
them.226 Even if certain scholars hand copy entire articles, these
scribes are unlikely to be charged with copyright infringement.227
As the dissent in American Geophysical pointed out, researchers
today use the photocopier as a mechanical note-taker-a faster and
more efficient method of study than old-fashioned, hand written
notes, but just as much a part of genuine research.228
Today's scientists use photoduplication in their investigations,
and researchers often copy material they believe to be relevant at
the beginning of their investigations, but that turns out to be useless
225. At least one commentator has argued that an annotated and highlighted copy
of an article is more likely to be a fair use than a pristine copy placed in someone's files.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 371.
226. "Basic research" has been defined as "find[ing] out as much about something
as you can, and if that path leads to something useful, all the better." IRA FLATOW, THEY
ALL LAUGHED 148 (1992).
227. In Williams & Wilkins, the Court of Claims made the following statement about
hand copying:
It is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten copy
of an entire copyrighted article for his own use, and in the era before
photoduplication it was not uncommon (and not seriously questioned) that he
could have his secretary make a typed copy for his personal use and files.
487 F.2d at 1350. But see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 467 n.16 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that no reported case holds hand
copying to be permissible, and citing an early American treatise asserting that hand
copying is not exempt from rule of copyright infringement) (citing A. WEIL, AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW § 1066 (1917)). Justice Blackmun's dissent also noted, however, that
reported cases regarding hand copying may be nonexistent because copyright owners do
not view litigation as cost effective in these circumstances. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
228. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 934 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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or extraneous at the end.229 Obviously, researchers do not know in
advance which materials will ultimately prove meaningless-if they
did, they would not waste time at the copy machine. But if copy-
ing qualifies as "research" under Section 107 only when the materi-
al is actually "used," scientists gathered around the photocopier will
be forced to play a guessing game as to whether they are vile
copyright infringers or blameless fair users. This incongruous
result cannot be what the court and Congress intended. Instead, the
court should have recognized that good research necessarily in-
volves gathering more material than may be employed, and that the
photocopying of journal articles as part of an ongoing examination
of scientific literature qualifies as "research" within the meaning of
the preamble to Section 107.230
Had the Second Circuit agreed with Texaco that Dr.
Chickering's photocopying constituted part of his research, what
impact should that fact have had on the court's evaluation of the
nature and purpose of Texaco's use?231  Some courts have main-
tained that when copyrighted material is used in one of the ways
described by Section 107's preamble, it should be presumed that
the first fair use factor favors the defendant.232 However, although
229. For example, in writing this Article, I photocopied many judicial opinions and
law review articles that I believed at the time to be on point, but that eventually turned
out to be irrelevant.
230. In Williams & Wilkins, the court determined that library photocopying of journal
articles qualified as medical research despite evidence that researchers usually kept the
photocopied articles "in their private files for future reference." Williams & Wilkins, 487
F.2d at 1348, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
231. Although Section 107 does not specify that the listed uses should be considered
as part of a factor one analysis, logically that is the factor to which the examples must
pertain. Courts typically assume that the preamble examples are meant to be considered
with respect to factor one. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct.
1164, 1171 (1994) (stating that a factor one inquiry should be guided by the examples
given in Section 107's preamble); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (considering the preamble uses under the heading "Purpose of the
Use"); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering
whether biography qualified as criticism, scholarship, or research under factor one), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
232. See, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d Cir. 1992) (ex-
plaining that when the defendant's use is for the purposes of criticism, comment, scholar-
ship, or research, a presumption exists that factor one favors fair use); Wright v. Warner
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the Supreme Court in Campbell stated that a factor one analysis
should be "guided by the examples given in the preamble to Sec-
tion 107, ''233 the Court went on to say that the named uses should
not be presumed fair.234 Instead, the Court suggested that a factor
one inquiry should focus on "whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative.' ' 235
This analysis completely ignores the named statutory examples
in making fair use determinations. If the only relevant question
with regard to the purpose and character of the use is whether the
use qualifies as transformative, then the illustrative fair uses listed
in the statute are rendered meaningless.236 They provide no guid-
Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating "there is a strong presumption that
factor one favors the defendant if the allegedly infringing work fits the description of uses
described in section 107"); New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (evaluating whether defendant's use was criticism, scholarship
or research), petition for reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1989) (Miner, J.,
concurring) (asserting that "[i]f a book falls into one of these categories [listed in the
preamble to Section 107], assessment of the first fair use factor should be at an end"),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
233. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
234. Id. at 1172. The Court explained as follows:
Like a book review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or
may not be fair use, and petitioner's suggestion that any parodic use is pre-
sumptively fair has no more justification in law or fact than the equally hopeful
claim that any use for news reporting should be presumed fair.
id. (citation omitted).
235. Id. at 1171. Of course, the Court's statement presumes that a "new work" is
involved, which was true in the Campbell case. In American Geophysical, however, the
copying was an intermediate step in the creation of a new work. See infra notes 245-67
and accompanying text.
Additionally, the Supreme Court noted in dictum in Campbell that "[t]he obvious
statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of
multiple copies for classroom distribution." 114 S. Ct. at 1171 n.11. For a discussion of
photocopying in an educational context, see supra notes 48-79.
236. This would not be true if the listed uses were presumed, instead, to be
transformative uses. Some judges and scholars have made this argument. See, e.g., Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that each use listed in the preamble to Section 107 is a "productive
use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first
author's work"); Dratler, supra note 113, at 291 (declaring that almost all the uses men-
tioned in the statute are productive); NIMMER, supra note 47, § 13.05[A][1][b], at 13-162
(explaining that the listed uses usually involve the creation of derivative works). But cf.
Lape, supra note 149, at 700 (asserting that teaching, scholarship, and research could
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ance to a court whatsoever. This unreasonable result could be
avoided if courts gave some weight (although perhaps not a pre-
sumption) in favor of fair use to the examples listed in the stat-
ute.237 Therefore, the American Geophysical court should have
accorded Dr. Chickering's photocopying some advantage with re-
spect to factor one because it was part of his ongoing research, a
use specifically selected by Congress as a potentially fair one.
2. Photocopying as "Transformative"
Even if the American Geophysical court had recognized that Dr.
Chickering photocopied the eight journal articles as part of his
ongoing research, that by itself would probably not have been suffi-
cient for the court to rule that factor one favored Texaco. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Campbell, a factor one evaluation
should also consider whether the defendant's use of the copyrighted
work was transformative in nature.238 Courts, including the Su-
preme Court, however, have been inconsistent in what
"transformative" means, using the term in at least two different
ways.2 9  Most recently, the Court in Campbell equated a
easily involve nonproductive uses).
237. The Sixth Circuit took this approach to factor one in Princeton Univ. Press v.
Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, vacated,
and reh'g en banc granted, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996). In that case, the court found
that the primary purpose of the copying at issue was "nonprofit educational." Id. at 1521.
Therefore, the court concluded that factor one favored a finding of fair use despite the
minimally transformative nature of the use. Id. at 1520.
238. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (1994). Prior to the Campbell case, the Supreme
Court had not given the transformative use doctrine such a ringing endorsement. See,
e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (relegating discussion of productive use to a
footnote, where the court explained that although "[t]he distinction between 'productive'
and 'unproductive' uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance... it cannot be wholly
determinative"); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (devoting one sentence to productive
aspect of defendant's article, and stating that "a productive use is simply one factor in a
fair use analysis").
239. Compare the Supreme Court's discussion of transformative use in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994), with the Court's treatment of
productive use in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455
n.40 (1984). Professor Lape has noted that some courts have explained "tranformative"
in a third way, as those uses which serve a different purpose from that furthered by the
original work. See Lape, supra note 149, at 711. Indeed, the American Geophysical court
also used the term in this manner. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
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transformative use with the production of a new, original work of
authorship. 24° Ten years earlier, however, the Court in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.241 focused on examples
of productive use that resulted in a public benefit, such as copying
by a teacher for professional or personal education.242
Since the Sony decision, most courts have implemented the
"new work" definition of transformative use rather than the "social
benefit" definition.243 Given that copyright law's function is to
encourage creativity and production of original works for the ulti-
mate benefit of society at large,2 both meanings of the term
"transformative" appear helpful in the appropriate circumstances.
Properly, the "new work" definition should be interpreted as a
subset of the "social benefit" position, and not as a limitation to
exclude socially beneficial uses that do not involve the production
However, in American Geophysical, the court used this definition as a variation of the "no
new work" concept, arguing that Dr. Chickering exercised no creativity in his copying.
American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 923. In other words, the court viewed the copy as no
more than a duplicate original-meaning that no new work had been produced.
The Supreme Court in Campbell also combined the notion of a new work with that
of a different purpose, asking whether "the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects'
of the original creation or instead adds something new with a further purpose or different
character." Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (alteration in original) (quoting Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
240. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
241. 464 U.S. 417 (1985).
242. Id. at 455 n.40. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun appeared to embrace both of
these concepts, stating that a productive use results "in some added benefit to the public
beyond that produced by the first author's work .... [I]n other words ... for 'socially
laudable purposes."' Id. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
243. See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1375
(2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that the addition of significant criticism or comment to defen-
dant's book would have resulted in a transformative use); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell,
803 F.2d 1253, 1255, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986) (using "productive" to mean the outlay of
original effort to develop a new work), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); Pacific & S.
Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1984) (videotaping of news programs not
considered transformative because defendant failed to add anything creative to original
broadcasts), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that the defendant's copying did
not "transform" the copyrighted materials through interpretation or the addition of any-
thing new).
244. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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of an additional work.245
In American Geophysical, the court determined that Dr.
Chickering's copying did not qualify as a transformative use be-
cause it merely duplicated the original work without "making some
contribution of new intellectual value. 24 6 Despite the court's refer-
ence to Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.247 in describing
Texaco's copying as "more appropriately labeled an 'intermediate'
use,"248 the court failed to follow through with the Sega court's
analysis to recognize photocopying as a first step in the creation of
a new work.
In Sega, the software manufacturer Accolade, Inc. disassembled
rival Sega Enterprises Ltd.'s copyrighted Genesis computer pro-
grams and, in the disassembly process, made a complete copy of
Sega's computer object code.2 49 The copied code then served as a
base from which Accolade created its own Genesis-compatible
video game cartridges.250 Sega sued Accolade for copyright in-
fringement, arguing that Accolade had disassembled entire pro-
grams and used its copyrighted code to produce competing prod-
ucts that reduced sales of Sega's games.251
The court disagreed, holding that Accolade's copying was a fair
use under Section 107252 because the copying was merely an inter-
mediate step in the creation of legitimate, original products.253
Regarding the first fair use factor, the court emphasized that Acco-
245. Professor Lape, on the other hand, takes the position that the "new work" theory
of transformative use should be eliminated, and that courts should instead consider (1)
whether the use is one listed in Section 107 of the 1976 Act; and (2) whether the use has
social utility. Lape, supra note 149, at 722. This approach, she argues, would ensure that
a work of little social value, such as a pornographic movie based on a copyrighted novel,
would not be favored under factor one just because it qualified as a new work. id. at
715, 722. However, any determination of "no social value" under this theory implicates
First Amendment issues, at least in as far as the new work consists of protected speech.
246. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 923.
247. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
248. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 921.
249. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514-15.
250. Id. at 1515.
251. Id. at 1516-17.
252. Id. at 1527-28.
253. Id. at 1522-23.
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lade's use served the public interest by ensuring the availability of
independently designed video games.254 Therefore, because of the
intermediate nature of the copying and the clear public benefit
served by the use (including the ultimate production of new
games), the court held that the first statutory factor weighed in
favor of Accolade. 5  Both definitions of transformative use were
met: the use ultimately resulted in both a new creative work and
a social good.
Had the Second Circuit continued with its comparison between
Texaco's copying and the copying involved in Sega, it would have
considered Dr. Chickering's photoduplication as an intermediate
step in the development of his own original research. Like Acco-
lade's copying of the computer code, Dr. Chickering copied with
the intent to generate new works of authorship; 256 his copying can-
not lose its transformative purpose because the new works had yet
to be produced.257 According to the legislative history of the 1976
Act, the language of Section 107 regarding "reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means' '258 was "intended to make
clear that the [fair use] doctrine has as much application to photo-
copying and taping as to older forms of use., 259  Any photocopy-
ing done for the purpose of comment, criticism, news reporting,
254. id. at 1523.
255. Id. In another case, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832,
844 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that making
an intermediate copy of object code for reverse-engineering purposes is a fair use. How-
ever, because the users in that case had obtained an unauthorized copy of the source code
from the Copyright Office in violation of that office's regulations, the court held that any
copying from that source code was not a fair use. Id. at 843.
256. The district court record showed that Texaco scientists were actively creating
their own works of authorship. From 1986 to 1991, Texaco researchers published more
than 130 scientific papers. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 16.
257. In Sega, for example, it can be assumed that the defendant's copying of the
computer code and the development of new computer games were not simultaneous. If,
as the court held, the copying of the computer code was a fair use, it must have qualified
as such from the moment of copying. See Dratler, supra note 113, at 291 (stating that
uses are transformative "if they are intended to produce new works of authorship, whether
or not they actually do so").
258. 17 U.S.C. § 107. For the complete text of this section, see supra note 17.
259. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5679.
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research, or scholarship will always be no more than an intermedi-
ate use; photocopying by itself never creates a new work of author-
ship, but rather only assists in its creation. All photocopying for
research purposes will, by its nature, involve a certain time lag
between the making of the copy and the completion of the original
work.2"
The Second Circuit, however, denied the notion that copying
for research purposes constituted a transformative use, stating that
"[t]he purposes illustrated by the categories listed in section 107
refer primarily to the work of authorship alleged to be a fair use,
not to the activity in which the alleged infringer is engaged."26' As
an example, the court noted that a newspaper could not "line the
shelves" with photocopies of journalism texts by arguing that the
copies were made in the course of news reporting. 262 The court's
reasoning presents two problems. First, the words of Section 107
explicitly pertain to activities and not to works of authorship; other-
wise, Congress would have referred to "news articles" and "scien-
tific treatises" rather than "news reporting" and "research. ' 263 Sec-
ond, even where a photocopied article clearly relates to a work of
authorship, the copying by necessity must start out as an intermedi-
ate step in the creative process. For example, if an investigative
reporter preparing an in-depth article about acid rain photocopied
a scientific journal article about the subject, the reporter's copying
would be done in anticipation of a work of authorship, rather than
260. One commentator has posited that although an attorney who duplicated a copy-
righted article "for the file" would not be engaging in a transformative use, the result
would be different if the attorney copied an excerpt for incorporation by reference into
a legal brief or a second article. See Steven D. Smit, "Make a Copy for the File...":
Copyright Infringement by Attorneys, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 15 (1994). However, this
analysis overlooks the fact that an attorney may copy an article and then file it until such
time as he or she has opportunity to cite it in a new work of authorship. Whether the
copying constitutes a transformative use should depend on the purpose of the copying, not
how quickly the user travels from the photocopier to the word processor.
261. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 924.
262. Id.
263. In pertinent part, Section 107 says that "the fair use of a copyrighted work..
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" is not an infringement of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 107; see supra note 17. See Lape, supra note 149, at 700 n.122.
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just as a part of the activity of news reporting. Similarly, Dr.
Chickering's photocopying was done in expectation of preparing
his own conference papers, books, and articles. 2 4 Instead of recog-
nizing the intermediate nature of Dr. Chickering's copying, howev-
er, the American Geophysical court described Dr. Chickering's use
as nontransformative because he archived the copies-he put them
in his personal files.265 The court characterized this archival copy-
ing as nontransformative because it "serv[ed] the same purpose for
which additional subscriptions are normally sold, or... for which
photocopying licenses may be obtained. '' 266 In other words, Dr.
Chickering could have bought his own subscription to Catalysis.267
Because Dr. Chickering photocopied the articles instead, the court
viewed him as acquiring a windfall-getting something for nothing
and depriving the publisher of deserved income in the process.268
Of course, Texaco, had already purchased three subscriptions
to the journal at the institutional rate; Academic Press was hardly
denied reasonable compensation for allowing Dr. Chickering access
to the articles.269 In granting the publisher an apparently unlimited
revenue stream from its periodical, the court used its definition of
transformative to ignore the purpose of the use. Instead, effect on
the potential market for the copyrighted work-factor
four-became the touchstone for factor one as well.270 This analy-
264. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 16.
265. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 923-24.
266. Id. at 924-25.
267. In fact, the court suggested that had Dr. Chickering bought his own subscription
to Catalysis, he could have made a spontaneous, single copy of a chart or diagram from
the journal to take directly into the lab without being guilty of copyright infringement.
Id. at 919. Still, the actual use of the photocopy would not be determinative; rather, the
important fact to the court is that Dr. Chickering would have purchased an additional
copy of the journal.
268. Id. at 922.
269. In 1989, Academic Press charged $828 for one institutional subscription to
Catalysis, which was double the individual rate. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at
7. Thus, since 1989, Texaco had been paying Academic Press almost $2,500 per year for
three subscriptions to the monthly journal.
270. The following statement by the court clearly shows its reliance on the economic
effect of the copying in ruling that factor one favored the publishers:
We do not mean to suggest that no instance of archival copying would be fair
use, but the first factor tilts against Texaco in this case because the making of
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sis inappropriately focused on the market impact of the copying,
and substituted factor four considerations for any meaningful evalu-
ation of the purpose of the use. 71
3. Photocopying as "Commercial"
The first factor of Section 107 requires courts to determine not
only the purpose and character of an alleged fair use, but also to
consider "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes." '272 As with the distinction between
transformative and nontransformative uses, the importance of the
commercial/nonprofit dichotomy in a fair use analysis necessarily
starts by comparing the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Sony 273 with those made in Campbell.274
Even though Sony presented the Court with a noncommercial
use,275 the Court nevertheless made the sweeping assertion that
copies made "for a commercial or profit-making purpose... would
presumptively be unfair., 27 6 This presumption against commercial
use drew scholarly criticism, 277 at least in part because it was not
copies to be placed on the shelf in Chickering's office is part of a systematic
process of encouraging employee researchers to copy articles so as to multiply
available copies while avoiding payment.
American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 920.
271. This observation has also been made by Professor Lape. See Lape, supra note
149, at 716-17.
272. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
273. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
274. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
275. The case involved videotaping of copyrighted television broadcasts by individu-
als for home use. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449; see infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
276. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. The Court restated the presumption when considering
the fourth fair use factor, saying that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner
of the copyright." Id. at 451.
277. See Dratler, supra note 113, at 263, 279 (commenting that the commer-
cial/nonprofit use presumption was created by the Court "out of thin air"); Fisher, supra
note 32, at 1672-73 (warning that commercial/nonprofit dichotomy results in "double
counting" market impact analysis of factor four); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that most of
the illustrative fair uses listed in the preamble to Section 107 "are generally conducted
for profit in this country, a fact of which Congress was obviously aware").
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clearly supported by prior case law. 278  When confronted with a
commercial parody case, however, the Court in Campbell reconsid-
ered its blanket presumption against commercial use, insisting in-
stead that "[tihe language of the statute makes clear that the com-
mercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one
element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character." 279
Although acknowledging that a commercial use "tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use, 280 the Court said that the weight giv-
en to the commercial nature of a use would change from case to
case, depending on other circumstances. 281 According to the Court,
primary consideration should be given to whether the use qualifies
as transformative, because "the more transformative the new work,
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercial-
ism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. ' 282 The court in
American Geophysical classified Dr. Chickering's photocopying as
a nontransformative use, and therefore concluded it could not ig-
nore Texaco's for-profit status in its fair use inquiry.28 3 By doing
so, the court committed two errors. First, as already discussed, it
miscategorized Dr. Chickering's photocopying as
nontransformative, instead of following through' with its more accu-
rate description of the photocopying as an intermediate use.284
Based on this misidentification, the court accorded too much signif-
icance to Texaco's for-profit status and "commercial" motivations.
278. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding commercial nature of use not controlling in fair use
determination); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a user's commercial motive was not enough
by itself to negate fair use); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,
626 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (asserting that fair use defense not defeated by
user's commercial purpose); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977)
(stating that commercial nature of use relevant but not decisive in fair use analysis);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (describ-
ing author's or publisher's commercial motive as "irrelevant" with respect to fair use).
279. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
280. Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1171.
283. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 921-25.
284. Id. at 923-24; see supra notes 229-51 and accompanying text.
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Again, a more appropriate analysis was provided by the Ninth
Circuit in Sega28 5 There, Accolade, a for-profit company, copied
Sega's video games with the commercial intent to manufacture
competing products.286 Although the court recognized that Acco-
lade benefited monetarily by virtue of its copying, the court found
this to be of "minimal significance" in its fair use determination.287
According to the court, Accolade's commercial gain was out-
weighed by the public benefit achieved by the production of inde-
pendently designed video games.288 Similarly, the Second Circuit
in American Geophysical should have considered potential social
benefits of Dr. Chickering's research, and not just Texaco's profit
motive in encouraging his scientific work. The court's second
error regarding the importance of Texaco's for-profit status with
respect to factor one is a more fundamental one, one that involves
the meaning of "commercial" as used in Section 107. The Second
Circuit in American Geophysical gave great weight to Texaco's
status as a for-profit organization in holding that Dr. Chickering's
photocopying was a commercial use.289 In fact, the court's opinion
indicated that had the photocopying not been conducted by some-
one employed by an "institution", the court might have been
reached the opposite result.29° The court again applied market
factors, this time to evaluate the nature of the user (rather than the
purpose of the use), stating that because Texaco eventually profited
from Dr. Chickering's research, Texaco should be required to pay
for his photocopying.291
What exactly does the term "commercial" mean as it is used in
Section 107? Unfortunately, courts, including the Supreme Court,
have not provided a simple answer to this question. Two major
285. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see
supra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
286. Id. at 1522-23.
287. Id. at 1523.
288. Id.
289. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 921-22 (stating that nature and objectives of
user must be considered in factor one determination).
290. Id. at 931 (stating that "[o]ur ruling is confined to the institutional, systematic,
archival multiplication of copies revealed by the record").
291. Id. at 922.
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definitions of the term have been suggested. First, copying has
been described as commercial when the unauthorized copies are
sold on the market, in competition with the copyrighted work it-
self.292  For example, the Supreme Court in Sony293 held that the
videotaping of copyrighted television programs by VCR owners for
later home viewing was not a commercial use.294 Had the video-
tapes been made for a "profit-making" purpose such as resale, then
the Court suggested that the copying would have been "commer-
cial."'2 95 It should be noted, however, that the Court used the term
"profit-making" to refer to the competitive sale of videotapes on
the marketplace, and not with respect to the for-profit or not-for-
profit status of the user.296
The Supreme Court provided a second interpretation of the term
"commercial" in its 1985 decision in Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.297 In that case, Justice O'Connor wrote
for the Court that "[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is
not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but wheth-
er the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price., 298 This more expan-
sive understanding of commercial would make copying by any for-
profit entity in effect a "commercial" use, because by definition,
those who claim a fair use privilege have not paid the "customary
292. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(equating "commercial" under Section 107 with "profit-making").
293. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
294. Id. at 449.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 450 n.33. This kind of competitive commercial use also occurred in both
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir.), opinion
withdrawn, vacated, and reh'g en banc granted, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996) and Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
where copy shops profited from selling unauthorized photocopies of copyrighted works
to students. The Sixth Circuit in Michigan Document Servs. found that the copy shop's
copying was performed primarily for educational purposes, and therefore qualified as a
fair use, 74 F.3d at 1521, whereas the federal district court in Kinko's held that the copy-
ing was an infringing commercial use. 758 F. Supp at 1530-31. For a discussion of these
cases, see supra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
297. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
298. Id. at 562.
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price. ' " As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent, such a defi-
nition would effectively negate Congress' list of illustrative fair
uses in the preamble to Section 107, because nearly all those who
engage in comment, criticism, news reporting, research and scholar-
ship do so for profit.300 This overbroad conception of "commer-
cial" has led other courts and commentators to conclude that a for-
profit company's unauthorized photocopying constitutes a commer-
cial use because it is conducted in the course of a profit-making
enterprise, with little or no attention given to the ultimate purpose
of the use.3°1
Which definition, if either, is the correct one? By looking to
public policy and the purposes of copyright law, the answer be-
comes clear. The proper definition of "commercial use" should
encompass those uses that have a negative effect on the creation
and dissemination of original works of authorship. 30 2 This ap-
299. For this reason, this standard has been criticized as both circular and useless.
See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 22, at 281; Fisher, supra note 32, at 1674 n.66.
300. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Most recently, in the
Campbell case, the Supreme Court cited this passage of Justice Brennan's Harper & Row
dissent for the proposition that the for-profit nature of the user does not necessarily make
the use unfair. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994) (citing
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
301. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 15-16 (holding that Texaco's copying
was a commercial use because it was done for commercial gain); Rogers v. Koons, 960
F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir.) (explaining that the first factor "asks whether the original was
copied in good faith to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of the
infringer"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); Pacific and S. Co., v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1496 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that news clipping service used copyrighted news
broadcast for commercial purposes because "profit is its primary motive"), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1004 (1985), see also Goldstein, supra note 2, at 222 (stating that Texaco's for-
profit status makes it subject to the Sony presumption of unfair use); PATRY, supra note
13, at 416-17 (maintaining that the nature of the user affects the character of the use);
WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 146 (3d ed. 1990)
(asserting that most business copying is not a fair use because it is done for commercial
gain); Smit, supra note 260, at 21-22 (describing photocopying by individuals employed
by for-profit companies as a commercial use). But see Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan
Document Servs., 74 F.3d 1512, 1521 (6th Cir.) (holding that copy shop's reproduction
of copyrighted excerpts was not a commercial use because the copies ultimately were
used for educational purposes), opinion withdrawn, vacated, and reh'g en banc granted,
74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996).
302. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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proach emphasizes the ultimate purpose of the use rather than the
profit/nonprofit status of the user. Unauthorized copies made to
compete with the original work by sale on the primary market, for
example, would obviously constitute a commercial use.3°3 If, how-
ever, unauthorized copies are made during the course of scientific
research with no thought to eventual resale, then the use should be
considered noncommercial, even if the copies were made by an
employee of a for-profit organization. Would Dr. Chickering's
photoduplication frustrate the copyright incentives for either the
authors or the publishers of the copyrighted articles? Concerning
the authors, the answer is clearly not. Academic Press did not pay
any of the Catalysis authors for their writings;3°4 therefore, a deci-
sion that their publisher would not receive photocopy royalties
should not have any effect on the authors' motivation to publish. 5
As noted by the district court, scholarly authors "have a far greater
interest in the wide dissemination of their work than in royal-
ties. '' 3°6 In fact, the district court record showed that many scientif-
ic authors supported Texaco's photocopying practices, and favored
allowing broad access to journal articles through photoduplication.3°
303. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the unauthorized copying
and sale by a copy shop of anthologies containing copyrighted materials qualified as an
educational rather than a commercial use. Michigan Document Servs, 74 F.3d at 1521.
However, the court had determined that the excerpts in question did not compete with the
original works on the primary market. Id. at 1523; see supra notes 46-74 and accompa-
nying text.
304. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 915.
305. This point was made by the dissent in American Geophysical. 60 F.3d at 941
(Jacobs, J., dissenting).
306. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 27; see also, NASRI, supra note 46, at
.156 (stating that in fields of science and technology, the principal reason for publication
is the dissemination of research findings).
307. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 27. The district court called this fact
"completely irrelevant," however, because the authors had assigned their copyrights to
Academic Press. Id. Contra Michigan Document Servs., 74 F.3d at 1524, where as an
additional fair use factor, the court of appeals considered evidence that scholarly authors
desire wide dissemination of their works.
Given the purposes of copyright law, the effect of the use on the works' authors
cannot be considered less important than the effect on the publishers. Although the
publisher plays a role in disseminating an author's work to the public, this role is neces-
sarily a secondary one. For the system of copyright incentives to work, the creative mind
behind the marketer must not be disregarded. Therefore, the correct approach would take
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Regarding the effect of photocopying on publishers' incentives
to continue producing scientific journals, any effect will be the
same whether the copying is conducted by a for-profit researcher
or by a not-for-profit scientist. Consider the following example:
imagine that a university researcher, funded with a grant from Tex-
aco, photocopied the same eight articles from Catalysis that were
duplicated by Dr. Chickering. 08 Is the university professor en-
gaged in scientific or educational research, a favored use under
factor one, or is he or she a commercial user because Texaco is
sponsoring the investigation?
If the purpose of the use is, in fact, used to answer the ques-
tion, then the for-profit/nonprofit/subsidized status of the researcher
should make no difference. In any of these scenarios, the purpose
of the use continues to be the furthering of science and the ad-
vancement of learning. Breakthrough discoveries and life-changing
inventions are just as likely to be made by scientists employed by
for-profit corporations as by those who work for nonprofits or are
unemployed.309  The greater public benefit provided by the use
consistently outweighs any commercial disincentive suffered by
journal publishers when the use involves photocopying for research
purposes. Research, whether conducted by a well-paid corporate
employee, a government technician, or a starving genius, consti-
tutes the primary purpose of the use; the use should not be consid-
ered commercial in nature.10
into account the effect of the use on both the authors and the publishers, rather than
considering one to the exclusion of the other.
308. The district court record revealed that Texaco finances university research, and
Texaco scientists collaborate with university researchers in shared areas of interest.
American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 16.
309. For example, important scientific discoveries, inventions, and advances made
by corporate researchers include things such as fiberglass (developed by the Owens
Illinois Glass Co., U.S., 1931), nylon (developed by Du Pont, U.S., 1937), the xerographic
copying machine (developed by Haloid Co., U.S., 1950), FORTRAN computer language
(developed by IBM, U.S., 1957); silicon 32-bit computer chip (developed by Hewlett-
Packard, U.S., 1981), and CD-ROM (developed by Hitachi, Japan, 1985). THE NEW
YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY, DESK REFERENCE 104-07 (1989); see also Flatow, supra note
226, at 149-51 (detailed account of the development of nylon); id at 111-18 (detailed
account of the development of xerography).
310. Commentators have quoted the Court of Claims statement in Williams &
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On the other hand, if either the corporate researcher, the univer-
sity professor (working pursuant to a corporate grant or not), or the
impoverished welfare recipient made the photocopies for profitable
resale, the purpose of the use should no longer qualify as re-
search.31' In this instance, the photocopiers are competing with the
publishers in the primary market for the journals, without providing
an offsetting benefit.31 All these copiers should now be considered
Wilkins, Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973), that "scientific prog-
ress, untainted by any commercial gain from the reproduction, is the hallmark of the
whole enterprise of duplication" for the proposition that the copying in that case was not
commercial because it was conducted by employees of two not-for-profit government
libraries. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 222 (distinguishing Williams & Wilkins
from American Geophysical by describing Texaco as a "commercial enterprise"); Smit,
supra note 260, at 25 n. 125 (equating commercial/noncommercial dichotomy with for-
profit/non-profit status of user); Tepper, supra note 42, at 351 (stating that the copying
in Williams & Wilkins was not a commercial use because "both libraries were nonprofit
institutions existing for the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge").
This is a misreading of the case, however, for the Court of Claims earlier explained
that it was not the non-profit status of the photocopiers that made the use noncommercial,
but rather the fact that "[tihe medical researchers ... have no purpose to reduplicate [the
articles] for sale or other general distribution." Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1344-45.
Therefore, the court emphasized not that the photocopiers were employees of non-profit
institutions, but that the ultimate users did not resell or otherwise use the photocopied
material for "forbidden ends." Id. In fact, the actual article users in the case consisted
of government employees, private practitioners, and for-profit drug companies. Id. at
1349, 1355.
311. See supra notes 255-85 and accompanying text.
312. It should be noted that Dr. Chickering's photocopying did not cause Academic
Press any financial harm in the primary market for its journal in any event. Texaco
already purchased three institutional subscriptions to Catalysis, and the company main-
tained it would not purchase any additional subscriptions to the journal regardless of the
court's holding. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 928-29 n.15. Dr. Chickering did not
want a subscription to or bulky back issues of the relevant volumes of Catalysis; he
wanted photocopies of the articles that he could highlight, annotate, take home, and place
in his files with ease. In fact, by using the Catalysis articles in his research, Dr.
Chickering might in fact have improved the primary market for Catalysis. It is not
unreasonable to believe that another researcher might see citations to Catalysis in Dr.
Chickering's work, and decide to purchase an issue of, or a subscription to, the journal.
. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals followed this reasoning in Michigan Document
Servs., stating that "use of the excerpted materials enhanced the prospect that the original
works might later be of interest to the student." 74 F.3d at 1523-24; see also NASRI,
supra note 46, at 142 (photocopying study showed that some researchers subscribed to
scientific journals after photocopying items from those journals).
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commercial users under factor one.313
This approach to factor one places greater weight on how the
nature and purpose of the use relate to the public welfare than to
any commercial benefit that the user may acquire from the use.
Because the public, rather than the copyright owners, constitute the
favored beneficiary under copyright law,314 this analysis accurately
reflects the ultimate purposes of the statute. The Second Circuit in
American Geophysical, however, left the public interest out of its
factor one balance by treating Texaco as a commercial user be-
cause its researchers were employed to develop profitable products
for the company.315 By overstressing Texaco's profit-making na-
ture, the court again employed market factors-the publisher's
purported loss of income and Texaco's chance of future prof-
it 316 rather than relevance to the public welfare in determining the
nature and purpose of the use.
B. Evaluating the Extent of Permissible Copying: Does One
Article an Entire Work Make?
The third fair use factor, the "amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, 31 7
forbids unauthorized users from exploiting copyrighted materials by
using "too much" of them .3 8 The measure of how much is too
much, however, changes from case to case because, according to
the Supreme Court, "the extent of permissible copying varies with
the purpose and character of the use., 319 For example, although the
Supreme Court in Sony320 stated that the reproduction of an entire
copyrighted work ordinarily would "militat[e] against a finding of
313. Contra Michigan Document Servs., 74 F.3d at 1521. But see Basic Books, Inc.
v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp 1522, 1530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a discussion
of the facts of these two cases, see supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
315. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 922.
316. Id. Interestingly, the court viewed Dr. Chickering's copying as too far removed
from real productive inquiry to constitute "research," but considered Texaco's ability to
profit from this "nonresearch" sufficiently definite to deem Texaco a commercial user.
See supra notes 206-221 and accompanying text.
317. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
318. Fisher, supra note 32, at 1675.
319. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1175 (1994).
320. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
1996]
696 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
fair use, 321 the Court nonetheless held that videotaping entire copy-
righted television broadcasts for home viewing qualified as a fair
322 2use. 2 On the other hand, in Harper & Row, 23 the Supreme Court
held that the taking of approximately 300 words from President
Ford's memoirs was qualitatively substantial because those words
made up "the heart of the book., 324 Measuring the amount of the
taking both quantitatively and qualitatively, courts apply a flexible
standard in evaluating this factor rather than any mechanical
rules.325
The Second Circuit in American Geophysical began its evalua-
tion of the third factor by identifying each individual journal article
as a "copyrighted work. 326 As a result, the court held that by
photoduplicating complete articles, Dr. Chickering had copied en-
tire copyrighted works. 327 Although recognizing that the Supreme
Court in Sony and the Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins Co.
both held that copying of entire works does not necessarily pre-
clude a finding of fair use,328 the Second Circuit, nonetheless, con-
cluded that the third factor weighed against Texaco in the fair use
balance.329 In its analysis, however, the court gave insufficient
attention to Texaco's argument that Academic Press sold the indi-
vidual articles only in issue format. Furthermore, the court inade-
quately addressed the nature and purpose of Dr. Chickering's copy-
ing in evaluating the significance of the amount copied.330  By
321. Id. at 450.
322. Id. at 454-55.
323. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
324. Id. at 564-65 (quoting the district court, 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
325. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating that "[tihere are no absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be
copied and still be considered a fair use"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); Fisher,
supra note 32, at 1676-77 (referring to "stubborn vagueness" and "notorious fuzziness"
of third factor).
326. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 926.
327. Id.
328. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50; Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353.
329. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 926.
330. Instead, the court cited the amount of Dr. Chickering's copying to bolster its
conclusion that his copying was archival rather than transformative under factor one. Id.
In other words, the court used the substantiality of the copying to assist with its factor one
determination, rather than using the purpose of the use to assist with its factor three
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viewing Dr. Chickering's photoduplicating as archival instead of as
an intermediate, transformative use, the court allowed the third
factor to function as a stand-in for factor four, and looked only to
the effect of the copying upon the market for the original work.
1. Market Availability of Copyrighted Work
The American Geophysical case involved both collective
works-entire issues of Catalysis-and individual copyrighted
articles within those periodicals.33' Dr. Chickering photocopied 100
percent of the articles in question, but only a small percentage of
the complete journals in which those articles appeared.332 Texaco
maintained that the relevant issues of Catalysis, rather than the
individual articles, constituted the "copyrighted work" for factor
three purposes because Academic Press traditionally marketed Ca-
talysis only in issue form.333 The Second Circuit dismissed this
argument in two words, calling it "superficially intriguing" before
concluding that because the articles were separately authored, they
each stood alone as separate, copyrighted works.3 34 Once the court
defined "copyrighted work" as the articles themselves, its conclu-
sion that Dr. Chickering had copied "too much" of the copyrighted
material was almost inevitable.
The Second Circuit, certainly, had the weight of precedent be-
hind it in defining "copyrighted work" as the underlying articles.
As the court noted, the Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins had
reached the same conclusion, finding that the two medical libraries
were guilty of photocopying entire copyrighted works for their
patrons when copying complete journal articles.335 In a variety of
evaluation. Id. Of course, because the court characterized the copying as archival, it
determined that Texaco should pay for the copies pursuant to a photocopy license. Id.
at 919-20.
331. Id. at 925-26.
332. At the district court level, Texaco argued that photocopying one eight-to-ten
page Catalysis article was equal to reproducing approximately four percent of an average
Catalysis issue. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 17.
333. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 925-26.
334. Id. at 926.
335. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353; see also Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (measuring
amount taken with length of magazine article, not entire magazine, without discussion of
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other contexts, courts have held that portions of collective works
can stand alone under the third fair use factor.336
Nevertheless, Texaco's argument regarding marketability is far
from trivial. Any factor three evaluation of the amount and sub-
stantiality of the use necessarily becomes entangled with factor four
market considerations. If the user has copied more than a small
portion of a work, the implication is that the user should have pur-
chased the material; using "too much" of a work is unfair because
of its detrimental economic effect on the copyright owner.337 In
this way, market ramifications ultimately become the thrust of
factor three.
Therefore, it seems manifestly unfair to ignore whether the
copyrighted work was separately marketed as opposed to being
available for purchase only within the collective work. In Ameri-
can Geophysical, Academic Press did not sell individual articles
from Catalysis; rather, it marketed only complete issues, back is-
sues and article reprints in quantities of 100 or more. 338 As a mat-
ter of copyright policy, Dr. Chickering's photoduplication of entire
articles would hardly reduce the publisher's market incentives:
copying an entire article will not diminish the market for that arti-
cle if it cannot be separately purchased.339 And the argument that
issue), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
336. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-
55 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that one-page parody qualified as entire copyrighted work);
Pacific & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1984) (ruling that
segment of news broadcast constituted whole copyrighted work), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1004 (1985). But see Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that cover of a magazine was not an entire copyright-
ed work because it did not embody the "essence" of the magazine).
337. A number of commentators have made this observation. See, e.g., Dratler,
supra note 113, at 313 (stating that the "primary evil of a predominantly borrowed work
lies not in the amount it has taken, but in its likely market effect"); Fisher, supra note 30,
at 1678 (noting that the "principal function" of the third factor "seems to be that of a
proxy for the amount of injury sustained by the copyright owner").
338. American Geophysical, 802 F.Supp. at 7.
339. In considering the fourth fair use factor, the Second Circuit admitted that "evi-
dence concerning the effect that photocopying individual journal articles has on the
traditional market for journal subscriptions is of somewhat less significance than if a
market existed for the sale of individual copies of articles." American Geophysical, 60
F.3d at 927.
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Texaco should have purchased a photocopy license is irrelevant at
this stage of the analysis. Selling a license to photocopy an article
is not the same as making the article available on the market: the
license assumes that the user has already purchased the article in
question.34
Therefore, although the Second Circuit correctly determined
that the underlying articles each constituted separate "copyrighted
works" for the purpose of Section 107,341 the court should have
accorded less weight to this factor because Dr. Chickering's photo-
copying caused Academic Press to suffer no market disincentives.
When users can be allowed access to copyrighted materials without
cost or loss to copyright owners, courts should favor the use in the
interest of broad dissemination of information and the promotion
of learning.
2. Intermediate Use of Entire Copyrighted Work
A factor three analysis should not stop with the determination
that the defendant reproduced entire copyrighted works; rather, the
inquiry necessitates a return to factor one considerations of whether
the defendant's use of the material was reasonable in light of his
or her purpose.342 By comparing the amount taken with the defen-
dant's justification for the use, courts can ensure that factor three
does more than duplicate factor four's market harm investigation.
The Second Circuit in American Geophysical purported to un-
dertake this appraisal, and concluded that because Dr. Chickering
340. The facts presented in the American Geophysical case are very different from
the situation where a journal publisher makes individual articles available through an on-
line database. Depending on the terms of the contracts between the various parties (pub-
lisher, database provider, and user) or pursuant to a judicial determination of who owns
the "new-use rights" to the material, a new market may now have been created for indi-
vidual articles. See generally Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't Put My Article
Online!: Extending Copyright's New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media
and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1995) (suggesting that rights to new uses of copy-
righted materials may be granted to publishers for all contracts that preceded commercial-
ization of a new medium).
341. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 926.
342. Addressing factor three, the Supreme Court stated "the enquiry will harken back
to the first of the statutory factors, for ... we recognize that the extent of permissible
copying varies with the purpose and character of the use." Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
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copied complete works, he must have been doing so for "archival"
purposes.343 The fact that Dr. Chickering engaged in verbatim
copying of various articles reinforced the court's inference that he
was merely developing a personal collection of materials without
paying for them.344  Because the court emphasized what it per-
ceived to be a market effect (despite the fact that no market existed
for individual articles), it refused to excuse Dr. Chickering for
using an entire work without purchasing it, or at least without pur-
chasing a license to photocopy it.345
Again, by classifying Dr. Chickering's photoduplication as
archival, the court ignored the true, underlying purpose of his copy-
ing.346 Dr. Chickering made photocopies as an intermediate step in
his research.347 Ultimately, he was unlikely to use much of any
particular article-perhaps a quotation or a footnote-in his own,
original authorship. 48 Rather than make detailed notes regarding
the articles, or keep the library volume in his office, Dr. Chickering
found it quicker, easier, and more accurate to make use of the
photocopier.349
As with its factor one analysis, the court should have looked to
Sega 350 for the proper approach regarding intermediate copying.
Although Accolade copied complete computer programs written by
Sega, it did so as a preliminary step in the development of its own
computer games. 351 Therefore, although the defendant in that case
copied entire copyrighted works, it used very little copyrighted
material in its final products. 352 The court observed that "where the
ultimate (as opposed to direct) use is as limited as it was here, the
343. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 926.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See supra notes 237-58 and accompanying text.
347. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 6.
348. Of course, Dr. Chickering would still be subject to a claim of copyright in-
fringement if, in one of his original works, he reproduced an extensive amount of any one
or more of the eight articles at issue without authorization.
349. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 918-19.
350. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see
supra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
351. Id. at 1523.
352. Id. at 1526-27.
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[third] factor is of very little weight. '35 3 Although the Sega court
emphasized it was dealing with the unique realm of computer soft-
ware,354 the court's reasoning applies equally well to the intermedi-
ate photocopying of traditional, written, copyrighted material.
Dr. Chickering can also be compared by analogy to the "time-
shifting" videotaper in Sony355 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the videotaping of entire, copyrighted television broad-
casts for home viewing constituted a fair use because the taping
merely allowed viewers to see something they could have seen for
free anyway, but at a more convenient time.356 Similarly, Dr.
Chickering photocopied articles he could have referred to in their
entireties at any time without charge in the Texaco library. 7 By
reproducing the articles, he gained the ability to review them at a
more opportune time, even at home.35 8 Although the Supreme
Court in Sony recognized that many VCR owners used their video
recorders to build libraries of tapes for repeated viewing, the Court
found that the primary purpose of the taping was for "time-shift-ing.''359 Likewise, although Dr. Chickering's copying could be
described as archival because he did not use the material immedi-
ately, his primary purpose in copying remained that of time-shift-
ing: to use the material in his research at a later date.
Texaco raised the "time-shifting" argument at the district court
level, where the court admitted that the analogy carried "some
force.,, 360 However, the district court went on to distinguish Sony
from American Geophysical, saying that "Texaco uses three sub-
scriptions to Catalysis to furnish copies to hundreds of scientists.
That is a far cry from the single user's one-time viewing hypothe-
sized in Sony."361 The lower court seemed to be saying that the
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1527.
355. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
356. Id. at 450.
357. At the time the suit was brought in 1985, Texaco purchased two subscriptions-
to Catalysis *for its library at the facility at which Dr. Chickering worked. In 1988, the
number of subscriptions was increased to three. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 915.
358. Id. at 918-19.
359. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.
360. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 22.
361. Id.
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time-shifting argument should not apply in American Geophysical
for two reasons: first, because the tapes in Sony would be erased
after they were viewed while Dr. Chickering could refer to the
copied articles more than once; and second, because American
Geophysical involved a greater magnitude of potential copying than
did Sony.
362
Both of these lines of reasoning contain flaws. First, it is im-
portant to keep the purpose of the use in mind when evaluating the
repeated-use argument. The research process necessarily entails
study over time; therefore, copies of articles made for research
purposes are likely to be retained for reference until their research
value is exhausted. In contrast, a television viewer is less apt to
need or want to view a taped program more than once.363 In each
instance, the proper question asks not how long the copied material
is kept or how often it is referred to, but rather what the copiers do
with it after their purposes have been accomplished. Once a re-
search project is complete, researchers may file their copies, at
least until the need for more filing space necessitates that the cop-
ies be thrown away. 36 Similarly, even one-time home viewers of
entertainment programs generally preserve the copies at least until
they run out of tape, at which point another program may be taped
over the first.365 It is unlikely that most viewers erase their tapes
immediately after watching them, just as researchers do not throw
their research materials away after reading them. More important-
ly, neither researchers nor home-viewers resell the copied material
after they have finished with it.
366
The second argument, contrasting the magnitude of potential
362. Id.
363. At least, this is what the Supreme Court assumed in Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 450
n.33 (1984), although it recognized that a significant number of viewers were also en-
gaged in accumulating libraries of tapes. Id. at 423.
364. Of course, the copies could be placed in storage, however, in my experience,
one is unlikely to refer to documents that are not readily available, whether they have
been archived at a remote location or placed in a box in one's attic.
365. This is my personal experience and that of my acquaintances. See Sony, 464
U.S. at 423-24 n.3 (providing an example of a VCR owner who retained taped programs
before erasing and reusing the tapes).
366. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
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copying in American Geophysical to that in Sony, compares apples
and oranges. The extent of potential copying in either case can be
properly examined in one of two ways: by comparing the copying
performed by one home viewer with that executed by one scientist;
or by comparing copying performed by millions of home viewers
with that done by Texaco's 300 scientists. When accurately con-
trasted, the universe of potential copyright infringers is actually
smaller in American Geophysical than that presented in Sony.367 In
fact, one noteworthy difference between the two cases relates to
compensation made to the copyright owners: while the viewer in
Sony paid Universal City Studios nothing to record its copyrighted
movies off their television screens,368 Texaco purchased its three
subscriptions to Catalysis.369 Texaco scientists, as time-shifters, did
not acquire something for nothing; rather, Academic Press demand-
ed additional compensation.
Furthermore, the district court's argument suggests that some
acceptable ratio exists regarding number of subscriptions versus
number of potential copiers for a use to qualify as time-shifting. 70
Put another way, would the district court have sanctioned Dr.
Chickering's copying as time-shifting had Texaco employed only
twenty scientists to share the three subscriptions? The Court in
Sony made no distinction between taping done by a single viewer
or a family of five.37' Clearly, the number of potential copiers
sharing a particular subscription (or broadcast) should make no
difference in the characterization of their copying as time-shifting
or not.
In summary, although the court accurately considered the indi-
vidual Catalysis articles entire "copyrighted works" for the purpos-
es of factor three, the court should have accorded this factor very
367. Texaco employed 400 to 500 research scientists nationwide. American Geo-
physical, 60 F.3d at 915. In contrast, in 1984, Justice Blackmun estimated that "millions"
of Americans owned and used VCRs. Sony, 464 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
368. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
369. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 915.
370. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp at 22.
371. The Supreme Court in Sony noted the testimony of Fred Rogers regarding
taping of children's programs by families. 464 U.S. at 445.
19961
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little weight in its fair use analysis. The court should have recog-
nized that although Dr. Chickering copied the complete articles as
a preliminary step in his research, ultimately he would use very
little of the original copyrighted works. Furthermore, by reproduc-
ing the complete articles, Dr. Chickering was engaged in time-shift-
ing-making copies to review for research purposes at a later,
more convenient time. Instead, the court improperly relied on the
market effect of the copying, concluding that Dr. Chickering should
have purchased the materials because he "used" them in their en-
tirety. By doing so, the court refused to consider the nature and
purpose of the use in evaluating whether the extent of Dr.
Chickering's copying was reasonable.
C. Searching for a Personal Use Exemption
Nine months after issuing its decision in American Geophysical,
the Second Circuit amended its opinion to include the following
assertions:
We do not deal with the question of copying by an individ-
ual, for personal use in research or otherwise (not for re-
sale), recognizing that under the fair use doctrine or the de
minimis doctrine, such a practice by an individual might
well not constitute an infringement. In other words, our
opinion does not decide the case that would arise if
Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist
engaged in copying and creating files for independent re-
search, as opposed to being employed by an institution in
the pursuit of his research on the institution's behalf.372
Later in the opinion, the court again emphasized that the ruling
"does not consider photocopying for personal use by an individu-
al. 373 The court's language leads to two related questions: (1)
does (or should) personal copying of copyrighted material enjoy
favored status under the copyright law, either as a separate exemp-
tion or as part of fair use?; and if so, (2) under what circumstances
does (or should) the personal use exemption apply? This Article
372. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 916.
373. Id. at 931.
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concludes both that limited photocopying for personal use does not
constitute an infringement, and that Dr. Chickering's copying in
American Geophysical should have qualified for this personal use
exemption.
1. Personal vs. Fair Use
By adding those few sentences noted above to its opinion, the
Second Circuit weakly attempted to address the private use issue
in the American Geophysical case. While the court's statement that
"copying by an individual ...might well not constitute an in-
fringement ' '374 was intended to be no more than dicta, the statement
highlighted the court's reluctance to deny categorically the exis-
tence of some form of personal use exemption. That such an ex-
emption exists, however, is neither certain nor clear. Although
some commentators argue that limited personal use of copyrighted
materials should be allowed under copyright law as a noninfringing
use,375 courts have rarely addressed the issue. The problem stems
from the statutory language itself-or more precisely, from the lack
thereof.
The 1976 Act includes no specific mention of personal use. In-
stead, Section 106 purports to grant copyright owners a bundle of
exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce the work in cop-
ies.376 This broad package of rights appears to be subject only to
374. id. at 916.
375. See, e.g., NASRI, supra note 46, at 88-89 (stating that copying for private use
should qualify as a fair use); Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 193-96 (concluding
that the existence of a personal use exemption is implied pursuant to the goals and poli-
cies of copyright).
376. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Section 106 provides as follows:
.Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) ,to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individu-
1996]
706 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
the 1976 Act's narrow exceptions, including the fair use377 and first
sale37' doctrines.
Two opposite conclusions can be drawn from the statute's si-
lence regarding personal use: first, that unauthorized, private copy-
ing infringes on the copyright owner's rights granted under Section
106 to the extent that such copying does not fall under a specific,
statutory exemption; and second, that the 1976 Act's provisions
were simply not intended to cover the behavior of individuals who
make copies for their personal use. It has been observed that mem-
bers of the public commonly hold the second point of view, believ-
ing that while the copyright law forbids anyone but the copyright
owner from commercially exploiting a copyrighted work, the law
does not proscribe private, personal copying.379 On the other hand,
copyright owners take the opposite tack, arguing that had Congress
intended personal use to be noninfringing, it would have said as
much. °
Professor Litman, by showing that Congress relied on represen-
tatives of those industries affected by copyright issues to draft the
1976 Act,38' has argued persuasively that it is impossible to deter-
mine the legislative intent regarding the copying of copyrighted
material for personal use.382 The 1976 Act grants broad rights to
al images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly."
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
377. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
378. The "first sale doctrine" is codified in Section 109(a) of the 1976 Act, and pro-
vides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized
by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
379. Litman, supra note 39, at 35.
380. This position is thoroughly argued in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 464-75 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
381. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change,
68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
382. Litman, supra note 381, at 315; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2 at 132-33.
Professor Goldstein has described the 1976 Act's legislative history surrounding the issue
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copyright owners, tempered only by specific exemptions tailored to
appease the interests of different classes of copyright users who
participated in the conference sessions. According to Professor
Litman, the private copying issue received no mention in the 1976
Act not because Congress carefully considered and then rejected a
personal use exemption, but rather because individual, private us-
ers-i.e., the public-were neither represented nor consulted in
these negotiations.38 3
Although the 1976 Act includes no specific provision exempt-
ing private copying from infringement liability, it can be argued
that the 1976 Act's Section 108 library exemption384 implies the
existence of a corresponding personal use exemption.38 5 Under
Section 108, libraries and their employees may make a single copy
of a copyrighted work for a patron's "private study, scholarship, or
research.386 It makes no sense to hinge the availability of the
exemption on who makes the copy-a library employee versus the
patron.38 7 Logically, because the library employee can make the
of private copying as "equivocal," citing a 1971 exchange between Congressmen Abra-
ham Kazen, Jr., and Robert Kastenmeier, Chair, House Intellectual Property Subcom-
mittee, to the effect that home sound recording would not amount to copyright infringe-
ment under the 1971 Amendment to the 1909 Act. Id. (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 34748-
49 (1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen and Kastenmeier)). However, as pointed out by
Justice Blackmun in his Sony dissent, the 1971 Amendment dealt only with the problem
of commercial record piracy under the 1909 Act, and has limited, if any, applicability to
the interpretation of the 1976 Act. Sony, 464 U.S. at 470-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
383. Litman, supra note 381, at 312-14.
384. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994). For a library to qualify for the Section 108 exemption,
its collections must be open to the public, 17 U.S.C. § 108 (a)(2), and it must not engage
in photocopying for any direct or indirect commercial advantage. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1).
See supra note 114.
385. See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 195.
386. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(d)(1), 108(e)(1). No reported cases define the meaning of the
term "private" as used in the statute. Professor Nimmer has advanced two possible mean-
ings: (1) that "private" is used to distinguish government or government-funded research
from research conducted and funded by the private sector; and (2) that "private" is used
to mean the opposite of "commercial." NIMMER, supra note 47, § 8.03[E][2][3], at 8-37
to 8-38. Another commentator has suggested that "private" means individual, as com-
pared to group or shared use. Martin, supra note 45, at 358.
For a discussion of the meaning of "personal use," see infra notes 352-65 and ac-
companying text.
387. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 1512,
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copy under Section 108 as agent for the patron, it follows that the
library patron can both make and possess the copy without trigger-
ing copyright liability.388
Furthermore, in a situation like the one presented in American
Geophysical where the individual making the copies owns the un-
derlying original copyrighted work, a personal use exemption
makes a logical corollary to the first sale doctrine.389 Under that
doctrine, the copyright owner's right to sell is extinguished upon
the first sale of the work.3' This provision ensures that second-
hand booksellers and people who sell their unwanted books and
magazines at garage sales are not breaking the copyright law.
Similarly, after a subscriber has purchased a copy of a journal, he
or she should be free to copy it, resell it, give it or throw it away
without obtaining permission or paying a fee to the copyright own-
er. If the owner of a magazine may lawfully sell it for commercial
gain at a garage sale or pass it along to a friend, it is absurd to
require him or her to pay a royalty to copy an article within the
magazine for his or her personal use.391
1520-21 (6th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, vacated, and reh'g en banc granted, 74 F.3d 1528
(6th Cir. 1996), where the court made a similar argument to justify a copy shop's duplica-
tion services as educational, and hence a fair use of the copyrighted materials. The court
reasoned that because professors and students could make their own copies of the materi-
als at issue, the copy shop was justified in making the copies on their behalf, without
changing the nature of the use. Id.
388. Congress explicitly noted that "[ilsolated, spontaneous making of single photo-
copies by a library in a for-profit organization, without any systematic effort to substitute
photocopying for subscription or purchases, would be covered by section 108, even
though the copies are furnished to the employees of the organization for use in their
work." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 19, at 75, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5689. In American Geophysical, Texaco did not argue that Dr. Chickering's copying was
exempt under Section 108 of the 1976 Act, presumably because Texaco's library did not
qualify as an open facility under Section 108(a)(2). However, the Second Circuit clearly
had this portion of the 1976 Act's legislative history in mind when it described Texaco's
photocopying activities as "institutional, systematic copying [that] increases the number
of copies available to scientists while avoiding the necessity of paying for license fees or
for additional subscriptions." American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 916.
389. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
390. Id.
391. Professors Patterson and Lindberg have expressed the same thought as follows:
[T]he subscriber to a periodical owns the pages on which the work is printed,
and such a dubious [photocopy] "license" being offered is an attempt to impose
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The state of the law, then, regarding personal copying is un-
clear at best. Superficially, the 1976 Act appears to give copyright
owners the exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted material.3 92
However, because Congress looked primarily to representatives of
affected industries for guidance in drafting the 1976 Act, it gave no
serious consideration to the issue of private use; therefore, the stat-
ute's silence cannot be said to rule out a private use exemption.
Furthermore, the library exemption contained in Section 108 of the
1976 Act and the first sale doctrine in Section 109 logically would
indicate that personal copying does not constitute copyright in-
fringement.
Apart from the statute itself, the weight of public opinion sup-
ports the notion that personal and workplace copying does not
violate the copyright law, as evidenced by the ubiquitous presence
of photocopy machines in offices, libraries, grocery stores, and
even homes. The making of single, spontaneous photocopies of
magazine and journal articles and book excerpts for personal use
is standard practice among doctors, lawyers, accountants, public
relations executives, scientific researchers, teachers, and homemak-
ers.393 Public opinion with respect to copyright law and its devel-
opment should not be ignored for two reasons: first, because cus-
tomary procedures and popular notions of what constitutes a rea-
sonable use can be influential in determinations of fair use;394 and
second, because laws that violate popular notions of fairness and
a restraint on one's use of his or her own chattel. The restraint has virtually the
same effect as saying that a subscriber must destroy a periodical after reading
it, cannot transfer title to it (either by gift or sale), or must return it to the
owner.
Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 185.
392. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); see supra note 375.
393. See Brown & Koch, supra note 7, at 3; Clayton, supra note 38, at 81-82;
Martin, supra note 32, at 346.
394. Not all commentators agree that custom should be considered in determining
fair use. Compare Weinreb, supra note 21, at 1140 (stating that customary practice
should play a role in determinations of fair use) with Leval, supra note 21, at 1125 (con-
cluding that considerations other than the four statutory fair use factors are "false").
The Supreme Court has described the fair use doctrine as "predicated on the author's
implied consent to 'reasonable and customary' use." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985).
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predictability foster disrespect for our system of justice.395 Al-
though Justice Steven's majority opinion in Sony 396 never specifi-
cally alludes to customary practice, the fact that millions of VCR
owners were happily engaged in video-recording television broad-
casts before the case even reached the Supreme Court undoubtedly
played a role in the Court's decision.397
Neither the 1976 Act nor the case law provide clear answers to
the question of photocopying for personal use; therefore, we must
fall back on the policies and purpose of copyright law to resolve
the issue. As noted earlier, the fundamental purpose of copyright
is not to ensure a guaranteed income stream to copyright owners,
but rather to foster the public good through the advancement of
knowledge.398 The copyright law protects against unauthorized
commercial exploitation of copyrighted material to encourage au-
thors to create and disseminate their works, and publishers to pub-
lish them.399 However, the copyright law should not be used to
grant publishers unlimited powers without regard for the rights of
consumers. If the 1976 Act is read to require an individual user to
purchase a license or pay a royalty before he or she can duplicate
a copyrighted article for personal use, then the copyright law is
being applied not to enhance but rather to inhibit that user's ability
to learn. Likewise, such an interpretation of the copyright law
creates a tax on learning-and only those wealthy enough to pay
the tax will reap the advantage provided by access to information.
The imposition of such a tax on a user who has already pur-
chased a copy of the work-like Texaco, which bought several
subscriptions to Catalysis but nevertheless was forced ultimately to
395. See Fisher, supra note 30, at 1732; Jessica Litman, Copyright As Myth, 53 PrIT.
L. REV. 235, 248 (1991).
396. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
397. For a fascinating report of the behind-the-scenes debate among the Justices in
the Sony case based on the papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, See GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 149-57. According to this account, Justice Stevens originally not only
took customary practice into account in formulating his position, but also favored finding
a statutory exemption for private copying, rather than relying on fair use to exonerate the
VCR manufacturer. Id. at 150.
398. 'See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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acquire a CCC license for its scientists to make single photocopies
from that journal-seems particularly egregious, especially when
extrapolated to analogous situations. Imagine the following sce-
nario: a law firm buys numerous valuable, copyrighted, works of
art to decorate its offices. To document the collection for insur-
ance purposes, the firm's business manager takes single photo-
graphs of each painting. Has the business manager violated the
copyright owners' exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted
works? The intuitive answer is "certainly not"; after all, the law
firm owns the paintings. If nothing else, the business manager's
actions should qualify as a fair use. But according to reasoning
announced in the American Geophysical case, copyright owners
need only to band together and form a cooperative licensing orga-
nization to require photographers to purchase photography licenses
before taking snapshots of copyrighted works of art.4° Under the
court's market approach to fair use, the fact that the law firm
owned the underlying works would have no importance because the
artists (or, more likely, their agents) had created a new market in
photography licenses. Because the business manager, employed by
a for-profit business, copied one hundred percent of the copyrighted
works for a nontransformative purpose instead of purchasing the
appropriate license, the case for fair use appears shaky, indeed.
Applied this way, the copyright law no longer protects the creator's
right to profit from his or her work, but instead rewards marketers
for devising new merchandising strategies.
This does not mean, however, that the intuitive answer was
incorrect. Rather, it means that making single copies of copyright-
ed works for personal use should be a separate exemption in the
copyright law, not left to be squeezed into the fair use doctrine. 4° t
Fair use developed as a method of allowing users to make limited
commercial use of copyrighted works without obtaining the consent
400. See American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 929-31.
401. This is not a new observation. See, e.g., Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45
at 193-96 (calling for recognition of the "rule of personal use"); Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 337 (1970) (suggesting Congress enact a personal use
exemption).
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of the copyright owner;' the statutory fair use factors make sense
with respect to cases involving commercial uses, but can be prob-
lematic when applied to personal use like the law firm example
given above.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sony403 illustrates how poorly
personal use of copyrighted material fits into the fair use doctrine.
Rather than recognize an implied personal use exemption, the Su-
preme Court in Sony labored mightily to conclude that home taping
of television broadcasts constituted a fair use.4'" To reach the prop-
er result-that such home-taping did not violate the plaintiffs'
copyrights-the Court distorted the fair use doctrine by devising
the much-criticized 4°5 presumption against commercial use.406 That
this presumption against all unauthorized commercial uses contra-
dicted the fair use doctrine's raison d'etre became clear even to the
Court when it was presented with a commercial parody case in
Campbell.47 In Campbell, the Court withdrew from its presump-
tion against commercial use, stating that the commercial nature of
the parody was only one element to consider under the first fair use
factor.4°8 To avoid this doctrinal confusion, and to ensure that fair
use continues to fulfill its intended purpose of allowing limited
commercial uses of copyrighted material, courts must recognize, or
Congress must enact, a personal use exemption to the 1976 Act.
2. What Constitutes "Personal Use"?
Private or personal use has been defined as the unauthorized
use of copyrighted materials by an individual for his or her own
402. Three of the four fair use factors-the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount used, and the potential market effect of the use-originated from Justice Story's
opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). That case involved a
competing use of copyrighted material. See generally Patterson & Lindberg, supra note
45, at 67-68.
403. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
404. Sony 464 U.S. at 450.
405. See supra note 257.
406. The Court stated that copies made "for a commercial or profit-making purpose
... would presumptively be unfair." Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
407. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
408. Id. at 1174.
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personal reasons-whether for business, pleasure, education, or to
share with a co-worker or friend.' The Second Circuit in Ameri-
can Geophysical tried to avoid the personal use question by stating
that the case did not present an instance of "photocopying for per-
sonal use by an individual."41 The court alluded to two reasons
why it did not consider Dr. Chickering's copying a personal use:
first, that it was "institutional"; and second, that it was "systemat-
ic. '' 41 Both of these characterizations hinge on Dr. Chickering's
employment by a large corporation.
Regarding the institutional nature of the copying, any distinc-
tion between photocopying done by a scientist employed by a big
company and that done by an "independent" researcher should be
irrelevant as long as the decision to make a copy remains an indi-
vidual one. The term "institutional photocopying" brings to mind
a company manager making multiple copies of one article to dis-
tribute throughout the institution-something that did not occur in
the American Geophysical case. If a scientist makes an individual
decision to photocopy a particular article-as did Dr.
Chickering-that decision is just as "independent" whether the
scientist works alone in a garage or in the research department of
a multinational conglomerate.1 2
Similarly, photocopying does not become "systematic" just
because a company employs many researchers, all of whom from
409. Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 193; see also Litman, supra note 381,
at 348. Cf. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Intellectual Property Rights
in an Age of Electronics and Information 194 (1986) (defining "private use" as "the
unauthorized, uncompensated, noncommercial and noncompetitive use of a copyrighted
work by an individual who is a purchaser or user of that work").
The fact that an individual makes a copy at the office rather than at home does not
make the copying any less "personal." See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 130. Similarly,
there should be no distinction between photocopying done by an individual to further his
or her job and that done for personal enjoyment. For example, I could photocopy an
article about business attire because I am interested in fashion, or because I want to
advance in my career. In either example, my photocopying qualifies as "personal."
410. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 931.
411. Id.
412. The dissent recognized that the "determinative issue" was "whether the decision
to photocopy individual articles is made by the individual researcher, as Dr. Chickering
did here." Id. at 936 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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time to time independently choose to photocopy certain articles.41 3
Again, the important question is whether each researcher-four or
four hundred4 14-makes a separate, spontaneous decision to copy
an article, as compared with the situation where a certain publica-
tion is always duplicated en masse to avoid the purchase of extra
subscriptions. Pasha Publications, Inc.415 presented an instance of
the latter. In that case, a company routinely made multiple cover-
to-cover copies of a newsletter for its employees in three branch
offices, a practice that was found to constitute true systematic
copying.41 6 In American Geophysical, however, Dr. Chickering
made his own, spontaneous decisions as to which articles he might
find useful in his research; 417 therefore his copying, and the similar
copying practices of his fellow researchers at Texaco, should not
be characterized as systematic.
Clearly, the number of copies made by an individual should
make a difference in determining whether the copying should be
considered "personal." When an individual makes a single copy of
an article, there is little doubt that his or her copying should qualify
as a personal use. Where, then, should the line be drawn regarding
number of copies? Suppose Dr. Chickering had made 50 copies of
one article to distribute to all the researchers involved in a particu-
lar project. Now his copying begins to look more like the "institu-
tional" copying decried by the court.
By definition, personal use does not include competitive use.41
Once an individual begins making multiple copies, his or her copy-
ing presents more serious commercial implications. For example,
the researcher who makes 50 copies of an article for an entire de-
partment perhaps should consider purchasing additional subscrip-
413. In the words of the dissent, "the selection by an individual scientist of the
articles useful to that scientist's own inquiries is not systematic copying, and does not
become systematic because some number of other scientists in the same institution-four
hundred or four-are doing the same thing." Id. at 935 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
414. Id.
415. 19 Media L. Rep. 2062 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
416. Id. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 108-22 and accompanying
text.
417. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 936 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
418. See supra notes 378-81 and accompanying text.
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tions, reprints or even a CCC photocopy license. A multiple-
copying situation like this creates a real danger of market harm to
the copyright owner; therefore, it is properly a question of fair use
rather than personal use.
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the personal use exemp-
tion should allow individuals to make no more than one copy of
copyrighted materials within a certain time period,419 and only as
long as the copying is done for noncompetitive purposes. 420 This
limitation would not mean, however, that an individual who makes
more than one photocopy of a journal article automatically be-
comes a copyright infringer; multiple photocopying simply would
be subject to fair use restraints.42' So, for example, a Supreme
Court Justice who made eight photocopies of a law review article
for his or her colleagues on the bench would not qualify for the
personal use exemption, but could be excused from infringement
liability under a fair use analysis.
Additionally, Professors Patterson and Lindberg have rightly
noted that certain copyrighted works-such as blueprints, architec-
tural plans, and computer programs-have what they call a "func-
tional purpose other than the dissemination of knowledge.4 2 In
other words, one is not likely to copy these type of works without
making use of the copies-actually employing them to run a com-
puter, or build a building.423 As such, the copies serve not to ad-
vance scholarship or learning, but only substitute for the purchase
of the original.424 As with multiple photocopying, the personal use
419. See Breyer, supra note 401, at 337.
420. See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 193-94.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 194-95.
423. Id.
424. Personal photocopying of articles or books is different because, although the
copying may substitute for a purchase, at the same time it promotes the constitutional
purpose of copyright-the advancement of learning.
Some commentators have suggested that the photocopying of an entire book should
qualify either as a personal use or as a fair use of the copyrighted material. See, e.g.,
Dratler, supra note 113, at 338. I disagree, and believe that a consumer should be al-
lowed to make one copy of an entire book as a personal use if he or she so desires. As
Professors Patterson and Lindberg have noted, the possibility that consumers may photo-
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exemption should not cover even single copies made of this kind
of work.425 When these types of functional works are copied, the
commercial ramifications of the copying are left unbalanced by any
corresponding public benefit in increased access to information or
the encouragement of personal education and growth. For example,
the personal use exemption should not allow one to make a copy
of Windows 95TM4 26 to give to a friend so that he or she is spared
the expense of purchasing it. To be exempt from infringement
liability, such copying would have to qualify as a fair use.427
An unavoidable question centers on how a personal use exemp-
tion would apply to copies made from electronic databases. Sup-
pose, for example, that Texaco cancels its paper subscriptions to
Catalysis and, instead, subscribes to an on-line service to provide
its scientists instant access to many different periodicals. Can a
Texaco researcher download a copyrighted journal article to an off-
line printer without violating the copyright law? 428 The answer is
copy entire books simply presents a marketing challenge to book publishers. Duplicating
a book involves time and expense, and results in an inferior product. As long as the
copyright owner markets authorized copies of the work a reasonable price, there can be
little doubt that most people would prefer to purchase an original copy of the book.
Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 157.
425. Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 45, at 195.
426. Windows 95 is a 32-bit computer operating system introduced in August 1995
by Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft Corporation, 1995 Annual Report 5, 8 (1996).
427. Of course, copying a software program such as Windows 95 also raises ques-
tions under the user's software license agreement that are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.
428. Section 101 of the 1976 Act provides that a "copy" is made whenever a work
of authorship is fixed in a material object "by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under this
definition, downloading information obtained from an electronic database clearly qualifies
as the making of a "copy."
Some would say that simply by retrieving the article into a computer's random
access memory to view it on-screen, an electronic database user has made an unauthorized
reproduction under Section 106 of the 1976 Act. See, e.g., Mai Sys. Corp. v. Peak Com-
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994); INFOR-
MATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORK-
ING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (July 1994) [hereinafter Green Paper].
A better analysis, it seems to me, is presented by Professor Litman, who concludes that
(Vol. 6:641
THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
an easy one. Absent any contractual provisions governing the right
to copy present in the subscription agreement between the user and
the database provider, the personal use exemption should apply to
single copies of articles made by individuals regardless of whether
the articles are obtained in a traditional or electronic library and
copied by a photocopy machine or a computer printer. Similarly,
additional reproduction beyond a single copy, whether by printing
from the computer or photocopying, should be governed by the
rules of fair use. By applying the personal copying exemption to
the electronic context, copyright owners will be denied the power
to make information users pay over and over again for electronic
access to information, and ensure that copyright law is not used to
stifle the dissemination of knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Knowledge is power. Though a cliche, it remains true nonethe-
less. Copyright law promotes universal access to knowledge by
rewarding authors and artists for disseminating their works to the
public.429  Although providing a monetary reward to copyright
owners is an important aspect of copyright law, this right to profit
must remain secondary to the paramount Constitutional objective
of furthering "the Progress of Science and useful Arts.
' 430
Two avenues exist to balance the consumer's right to obtain
information with the copyright owner's desire to secure a profit.
The first-the fair use doctrine-was created to allow competitive
users to employ portions of a copyrighted work in the creation of
new works.43 The second-the personal use exemption-guards
the right of a non-competitive consumer to use a copyrighted work
for learning purposes.432 Unfortunately, and because at least in part
"the act of reading a work into a computer's random access memory is too transitory to
create a reproduction within the meaning of Section 106(1)" of the 1976 Act. Litman,
supra note 39, at 42.
429. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
430. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
431. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 371-85 and accompanying text.
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of an absence of language in the 1976 Act dealing with personal
use, courts have generally refused to recognize a personal use ex-
emption.433 As a result, courts have decided the few reported cases
involving personal use of copyrighted materials by resorting to, and
consequently distorting, the fair use exemption.434
American Geophyica4 35 presents such a situation. The case
could and should have been resolved in favor of Texaco on the
grounds that the copying at issue-single, spontaneous copies made
of isolated journal articles for research purposes-was exempt from
copyright infringement liability as a personal use. The Second
Circuit, however, declined to apply a personal use exemption and
instead analyzed the case from a fair use perspective. Even still,
the court could have reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong
reason, had it properly applied the fair use doctrine to the facts of
the case.
However, the court erred again by deciding the case based on
an overly economic approach to fair use. In holding that the re-
searcher's copying did not constitute a fair use, the court reasoned
that only the second fair use factor-the nature of the copyrighted
work-favored Texaco.436 By concluding that the photocopying
was "archival" rather than transformative under factor one, the
court failed to recognize the gathering and accumulation of data as
the first step in scientific research. Instead, the court stated that
because Dr. Chickering merely "archived" the copies, Texaco ought
to pay for those copies again pursuant to a photocopy license.437
Furthermore, the court relied on Texaco's for-profit status to classi-
fy Texaco as a commercial user of the material that could clearly
afford a photocopy license, and failed to consider the relevance of
the use to the public welfare.
Similarly, regarding factor three, the amount and substantiality
of the use, the court disregarded the nature and purpose of the use
433. See supra notes 366-71 and accompanying text.
434. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984); see also supra notes 352-66 and accompanying text.
435. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
436. Id. at 925, 931.
437. Id. at 919-20.
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in evaluating whether the extent of the copying was reasonable.438
Rather, the court used the magnitude of Dr. Chickering's copying
to support its conclusion that the copying was archival in nature,439
for which Texaco should have purchased a photocopy license.
0
By applying a pure market approach to factors one and three, the
court in effect read those factors out of its fair use analysis, and
triple-counted the fourth fair use factor, the market effect of the
use. As a result, the court favored the publisher's desire for profit,
and overlooked the fundamental copyright objective of promoting
learning and scholarship.
The case raises serious implications regarding the future of fair
use in non-educational settings such as the workplace. According
to the Second Circuit, a use becomes "less fair" whenever copy-
right owners develop a way to make users pay for the use."1 Al-
ready, some commentators have suggested discarding the fair use
doctrine altogether with respect to photocopying now that licensing
organizations such as the CCC are in place." 2 Both the court and
these commentators have failed to understand that the creation of
new revenue streams for publishers is not copyright's ultimate
purpose. Rather, fair use is intended to balance copyright owners'
right to reasonable compensation with the public need for wide
dissemination of information." 3 A pure market approach to fair
use balances the public interest right out of the fair use equation by
creating a user's tax on access to information. Significantly, the
market rationale of American Geophysical can easily be applied to
electronic data collection. Should this occur, copyright owners will
be able to impose ever-increasing tolls on the information super-
highway.
Courts can help achieve a proper balance between the rights of
copyright owners and those of information consumers by truly
considering non-economic factors in applying the fair use doctrine.
438. Id. at 925-26; see supra note 329 and accompanying text.
439. Id. at 926.
440. Id. at 919-20.
441. Id. at 931.
442. See Barry, supra note 32, at 412-14; Martin, supra note 32, at 392.
443. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, courts must either recognize or Congress must enact
a personal use exemption that would allow consumers to make
single copies of copyrighted materials without obtaining the copy-
right owner's permission or paying any royalty or licensing fees.
Lately, much discussion has centered on whether the 1976 Act
should be amended to protect copyright owner's rights in light of
new technology. 4" The need for corresponding protection for us-
ers' rights is crucial. Whether through a personal use exemption
or correct application of the fair use doctrine, the protection of
users' rights is necessary to fulfill the fundamental goal of copy-
right law-the advancement of learning.
444. See, e.g., Green Paper, supra note 428, at 120-34; Freddie Baird, Legal Issues
and the Internet: Heading West Along the Information Superhighway, 58 TEX. B.J. 1138
(1995); Ron Coleman, Copycats on the Superhighway, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 68, 68-71;
Robert Holleyman, Law Has Not Kept Up With Technology, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995,
at C46, C46-47. For a perceptive article by Professor Litman urging that the public
interest as well as that of the copyright owners be represented in the 1976 Act revision
process, see generally Litman, supra note 330.
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